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Abstract—Most mobile network operators generate revenues
by directly charging users for data plan subscriptions. Some
operators now also offer users data rewards to incentivize them
to watch mobile ads, which enables the operators to collect
payments from advertisers and create new revenue streams.
In this work, we analyze and compare two data rewarding
schemes: a Subscription-Aware Rewarding (SAR) scheme and a
Subscription-Unaware Rewarding (SUR) scheme. Under the SAR
scheme, only the subscribers of the operators’ data plans are
eligible for the rewards; under the SUR scheme, all users are
eligible for the rewards (e.g., the users who do not subscribe to
the data plans can still get SIM cards and receive data rewards
by watching ads). We model the interactions among an operator,
users, and advertisers by a two-stage Stackelberg game, and
characterize their equilibrium strategies under both the SAR
and SUR schemes. We show that the SAR scheme can lead to
more subscriptions and a higher operator revenue from the data
market, while the SUR scheme can lead to better ad viewership
and a higher operator revenue from the ad market. We further
show that the operator’s optimal choice between the two schemes
is sensitive to the users’ data consumption utility function and the
operator’s network capacity. We provide some counter-intuitive
insights. For example, when each user has a logarithmic utility
function, the operator should apply the SUR scheme (i.e., reward
both subscribers and non-subscribers) if and only if it has a small
network capacity.
Index Terms—Stackelberg game, network economics, mobile
data rewards, business model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the rapid growth of global mobile traffic, several
leading analyst firms estimate that global mobile service
revenue has nearly reached a saturation point. For example,
Strategy Analytics forecasts that the global mobile service
revenue will only increase by 3% between 2018 and 2021
[2]. As suggested in [3], one promising approach for the
mobile network operators to create new revenue streams is
to offer mobile data rewards: the network operators reward
users with free mobile data every time the users watch mobile
ads delivered by the operators, and the operators are paid by
the corresponding advertisers.
The data rewarding paradigm leads to a “win-win-win”
outcome [3]. First, the operators monetize their services based
on the mobile advertising, the global revenue of which was
estimated to reach $80 billion at the end of 2017 [3]. Second,
the advertisers gain incentivized advertising, where the rewards
incentivize the users to better engage with ads and the advertis-
ers allow the users to have more control over their experiences
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(e.g., whether and when to watch ads). According to surveys
conducted by Forrester Consulting, IPG Media Lab, and Kiip,
most mobile app users prefer to watch ads with rewards than
to watch targeted ads [4]. Third, the users earn free mobile
data to satisfy their growing data demand.
There has been an increasing number of businesses entering
this space. Aquto and Unlockd are two leading companies
that provide technical support for data rewarding (e.g., they
develop mobile apps that display ads and track the amount
of rewarded data). Aquto has collaborated with operators,
such as Verizon and Telefonica [5]. Unlockd has collaborated
with Tesco Mobile (in the United Kingdom), Boost Mobile
(in the United States), Lebara Mobile (in Australia), and
AXIS (in Indonesia) [6]. Other examples of operators that
have offered data rewards include DOCOMO, Optus, and
ChungHwa Telecom [7], [8]. Furthermore, AT&T recently ac-
quired AppNexus (a leading online advertising company) and
will make a significant investment in the advertising business
[9]. Offering mobile data rewards could become a natural and
effective approach to further monetize an operator’s mobile
service.
We use an example in Table I to show that offering data
rewards might lead to a significant revenue improvement for
an operator. Suppose that an operator rewards 0.5MB of data
per image ad.1 If a user watches 40 image ads every day,2 it
can get 600MB of data after 30 days. When the CPM (cost
per thousand impressions, also called cost per mille) is $8.2
[12], the operator’s corresponding ad revenue is $9.84. In other
words, the operator gets $9.84 by rewarding 600MB of data
to the user. As a comparison, the conventional data pricing
is less profitable to the operator. As shown in [13], operators
only charge a user an extra $4 when the user switches from a
1GB data plan to a 2GB data plan.
Based on the eligibility of receiving rewards, there are two
basic types of data rewarding schemes. In the Subscription-
Aware Rewarding (SAR) scheme, the operators only allow the
users who subscribe to the operators’ existing data plans (with
monthly fees) to watch ads for rewards.3 In the Subscription-
Unaware Rewarding (SUR) scheme, the operators reward
all users for watching ads, regardless of whether the users
1To ensure that users carefully watch the ads, the operator can ask ad-related
questions before giving the rewards [10].
2According to [11], a mobile user unlocks its phone 80 times per day on
average. Then, watching 40 image ads per day is similar to watching an image
ad every two times the user unlocks its phone.
3Some operators, such as AT&T and Verizon, offer unlimited data plans
[14]. However, when the actual data usage of an unlimited data plan’s sub-
scriber exceeds a threshold, the subscriber’s network speed will be throttled.
Hence, the unlimited data plans’ subscribers may also earn free high-speed
data by watching ads.
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2TABLE I: Example of Data Rewards
Rewarding Plan A User’s Views and Reward (Per Month) Calculation of Operator’s Ad RevenueViews Reward CPM Views/1000×CPM=Ad Revenue
0.5MB per image ad 1200 image ads 600MB $8.2 1200/1000×$8.2=$9.84
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Fig. 1: Data rewarding ecosystem (user 4 is feasible under the SUR scheme,
but is infeasible under the SAR scheme).
subscribe to the data plans.4 Intuitively, the SAR scheme leads
to more subscriptions and the SUR scheme incentivizes more
users to watch ads. The optimal design and comparison of the
two schemes are crucial for realizing the full potential of the
mobile data rewards, which motivates our work.
A. Our Contributions
We illustrate the data rewarding ecosystem in Fig. 1. The
purple arrows indicate that an operator charges the users for
data plan subscriptions. The orange arrows indicate that the
operator rewards the users for watching ads and gets payments
from the advertisers.
We model the interactions among the operator, users, and
advertisers by a two-stage Stackelberg game. In Stage I, the
operator decides the unit data reward (i.e., the amount of
data rewarded for watching one ad) for the users, and the
ad price (i.e., the payment for purchasing one ad slot) for the
advertisers. In Stage II, the users with different valuations for
the mobile service make their data plan subscription and ad
watching decisions. We consider a general data consumption
utility function and a general distribution of user valuation.
Meanwhile, the advertisers decide the number of ad slots to
purchase, considering the advertising’s wear-out effect (i.e.,
an ad’s effectiveness can decrease if it reaches a user who has
watched the same ad for several times [15], [16]).
We analyze the two-stage game for both the SAR and SUR
schemes. In particular, we characterize the operator’s optimal
strategy that maximizes the total revenue from the data market
and ad market. Our key findings in this work are as follows.
I. Design of Unit Data Reward (Theorems 2 and 3):
Under both the SAR and SUR schemes, the operator should not
always use up the available network capacity for data rewards.
4The operators can offer free specialized SIM cards to the users who do
not subscribe to the data plans. These users can top up the cards by watching
ads, as shown in [7].
Under the SAR scheme, increasing the unit data reward can
lead to more data plan subscriptions and motivate more users
to watch ads. However, it also allows a user to obtain a larger
amount of data after watching a few ads. Hence, a user may
watch fewer ads under a larger unit data reward. As a result,
increasing the unit data reward may decrease the operator’s
revenue. Under the SUR scheme, (besides the above negative
impact) increasing the unit data reward may lead to a loss in
data plan subscriptions, and even generate a revenue that is
lower than the revenue when the operator does not offer any
data reward. In our work, we derive two sufficient conditions,
under which the operator does and does not use up the capacity
for data rewards, respectively.
II. Design of Ad Price (Theorems 1 and 4): Given the
unit data reward, the operator’s optimal ad price is affected by
the wear-out effect if and only if the wear-out effect is small.
If the wear-out effect is small, the operator should sell all ad
slots and its optimal ad price should decrease with the wear-
out effect; otherwise, the operator should not sell all ad slots
and its optimal ad price will be independent of the wear-out
effect. Moreover, under the SUR scheme, the operator can
differentiate the ad slots generated by the subscribers and
non-subscribers when selling the ad slots to the advertisers
and displaying the ads to the users. We numerically show
that this can improve the operator’s total revenue by up to
20.3%. Under the SUR scheme, both the subscribers and non-
subscribers watch ads. Since the subscribers also obtain data
from the data plan, the subscribers and non-subscribers may
watch different numbers of ads. Because of the advertising’s
wear-out effect, each advertiser has a different willingness to
purchase the ad slots generated by the subscribers and non-
subscribers, and it is beneficial for the operator to differentiate
these ad slots.
III. Choice of Rewarding Scheme (Theorem 5; Obser-
vations 1, 2, and 3): The operator’s choice between the
SAR and SUR schemes is heavily affected by the users’ data
consumption utility function and network capacity. When each
user has a logarithmic utility function or each user has a
generalized α-fair utility function [17], if the network capacity
is limited, the operator should apply the SUR scheme (i.e.,
reward both subscribers and non-subscribers); if the capacity
is large, it should apply the SAR scheme (i.e., only reward
the subscribers). When each user has an exponential utility:
(i) under a large wear-out effect, the choice between the two
schemes is similar to the logarithmic utility case; (ii) under
a small wear-out effect, the operator should always apply the
SUR scheme, regardless of the capacity.
Our comparison between the SAR and SUR schemes also
provides insights for a more general problem, where the
operator offers multiple data plans and decides whether to
only allow the subscribers of the expensive data plans to
earn rewards. Our analysis of the SAR and SUR schemes
3captures the key considerations of choosing these schemes
(e.g., whether to motivate more subscriptions to the expensive
data plans or incentivize more ad watching).
B. Related Work
1) Provision of Fee-Based and Ad-Based Services: There
has been some work studying markets where providers offer
both a fee-based service and an ad-based free service. For
example, Riggins in [18] studied an online publisher that offers
both the fee-based and ad-based versions of its website. In
[19], a Wi-Fi network provider allows users to either directly
pay or watch ads to access the Wi-Fi network. In [20], an
app developer offers virtual items, and each app user will
either pay or watch ads to obtain them in the equilibrium. In
these studies, the fee-based and ad-based services are always
substitutes, and each user chooses between these two options.
In our work, their relation is more complicated, since a user
may subscribe to the data plan and meanwhile watch ads for
more data. Under the SAR scheme, increasing the reward
for watching ads can increase the number of subscribers,
which shows the complementary relation between the subscrip-
tion and data rewards. Therefore, our work studies a novel
structure, and derives new insights for the joint provision
of fee-based and ad-based services. Furthermore, our work
considers the operator’s capacity for providing the service and
the advertising’s wear-out effect, which were not considered
in [19] and [20].
2) Sponsored Mobile Data: As studied in [17], [21]–[23],
sponsored data provides another way for operators to create
new revenue streams: content providers sponsor the data usage
of their content, and users can access the content free of
charge. There are several key differences between sponsored
data and data rewards as studied here. First, the users can
consume sponsored data only for the content specified by the
content providers, while they can use reward data to access
any online content. Second, with sponsored data, the content
providers benefit from the users’ data consumption on the
corresponding content. With data rewards, the advertisers aim
to deliver ads effectively, and do not benefit from the users’
data consumption.
3) Other Related References: Other related work includes
[24]–[26]. Bangera et al. in [24] conducted a survey, which
shows that 76% of the respondents are interested in watching
ads in exchange for mobile data. Sen et al. in [25] conducted
an experiment to study the effectiveness of monetary rewards
in increasing ads’ viewership. Both [24] and [25] did not
analyze the equilibrium strategies of the entities, such as
operators, advertisers, and users. Harishankar et al. in [26]
studied monetizing the operator’s idle network capacity by
providing users with supplemental discount offers, which are
not related to advertising.
II. MODEL
In this section, we model the strategies of the operator,
users, and advertisers, and introduce the two-stage game. We
use capital letters to denote parameters, and lower-case letters
to denote decision variables or random variables.
A. Network Operator
We consider a monopolistic operator, who offers a predeter-
mined (monthly) flat-rate data plan (F,Q) to users. Parameter
F > 0 denotes the subscription fee, and Q > 0 denotes the
data amount associated with a subscription.5 To derive insights
into the data reward design, we focus on a single-operator,
single-data plan scenario, which has been widely considered
in literature (e.g., [17], [23]).
The operator decides two variables: (i) a unit data reward
ω ∈ [0,∞), which is the amount of data that a user receives
for watching one ad; (ii) an ad price p ∈ (0,∞), which is the
price that the operator charges the advertisers for buying one
ad slot. Here, we consider a price-based mechanism, where
the operator sells the ad slots in advance at a fixed price.6
B. Users
We consider a continuum of users, and denote the mass of
users by N . Let θ denote a user’s type, which parameterizes its
valuation for mobile service. We assume that θ is a continuous
random variable drawn from [0, θmax], and its probability
density function g (θ) satisfies g (θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [0, θmax].
Let r ∈ {0, 1} denote a user’s data plan subscription
decision, and x ∈ [0,∞) denote the number of ads that a user
chooses to watch (during one month). We allow x and the
advertisers’ purchasing decisions to be fractional [19], [28].
The amount of data that a user obtains from its subscription
and ad watching is Qr+ωx. We use θu (Qr + ωx) to capture
a type-θ user’s utility of using the mobile service. Here,
u (z) , z ≥ 0, is the same for all users, and can be any strictly
increasing, strictly concave, and twice differentiable function
that satisfies u (0) = 0 and limz→∞ u′ (z) = 0. The concavity
of u (z) captures the diminishing marginal return with respect
to the data amount. Unless otherwise specified, our results are
derived under a general u (z) that satisfies these properties. To
study the impact of u (z)’s shape, we will also consider three
concrete choices of u (z) used in the literature:
• Logarithmic function [29], [30]: u (z) = ln (1 + z);
• Generalized α-fair function [17]: u (z) = (z+µ)
1−α
1−α −
µ1−α
1−α , 0 < α < 1, µ ≥ 0;
• Exponential function [31]: u (z) = 1− e−γz, γ > 0.
One reason for considering these is that the logarithmic
function and generalized α-fair function are not upper bounded
for z ≥ 0, while the exponential function is upper bounded.
This difference will affect the optimal choice between the SAR
and SUR schemes. For ease of exposition, we call u (·) a user’s
utility function (although the actual utility is θu (·)).
5Compared with designing data rewards, the operator has less flexibility to
adjust its data plan (e.g., subscribers may sign long-term contracts with the
operator). Hence, we study the operator’s reward design, given its existing data
plan. In our future work, we plan to extend our analysis by jointly optimizing
the data plan and reward.
6The operator and advertisers usually have large-scale collaborations, e.g.,
an advertiser’s ads are displayed around 300,000 times per promotion activity.
In this case, the price-based mechanism facilitates the customization and
communication process [27]. The operator can also sell the slots via the real-
time auction, especially when it has some user profiles and the advertisers want
to target different user categories [27]. We leave the study of heterogeneous
advertisers and real-time auctions to future work.
4A type-θ user’s payoff is
Πuser (θ, r, x, ω) = θu (Qr + ωx)− Fr − Φx, (1)
where F is the subscription fee, and Φ > 0 denotes a user’s
average disutility (e.g., inconvenience) of watching one ad.
We assume that the total disutility of watching ads linearly
increases with the number of watched ads [20], [32].
In Sections III-A and IV-A, we will analyze the users’
optimal decisions r∗ (θ, ω) and x∗ (θ, ω). Next, we introduce
two notations to capture the total number of ad slots created by
users. Let Nad (ω) denote the mass of users with x∗ (θ, ω) > 0
(i.e., who watch ads), and let y be the value of x∗ (θ, ω) chosen
by one of these Nad (ω) users. Because these Nad (ω) users
may have different types θ, they may have different values of
x∗ (θ, ω), i.e., watch different numbers of ads. Therefore, y is
a random variable. The distribution of y gives the distribution
of the number of ads watched by a user given that the user
watches ads.7 The expected total number of created ad slots is
simply the expected total number of ads watched by the users,
given by E [y]Nad (ω).
C. Advertisers
We consider K homogeneous advertisers. When Nad (ω) >
0, we assume that to display the ads to a user, the operator
randomly draws ads from all the E [y]Nad (ω) ad slots without
replacement.
Suppose an advertiser purchases m ∈ [0,∞) ad slots from
the operator (in Sections III-C and IV-C, the operator will
choose its ad price p to ensure that the total number of sold
ad slots does not exceed E [y]Nad (ω)). If a user watches
y ads, on average, myE[y]Nad(ω) ads among the y watched ads
belong to this advertiser. We let ψ (m, y, ω) denote the overall
effectiveness of the advertiser’s advertising on the user (e.g., a
large ψ (m, y, ω) implies that the user has a good impression
of the advertiser’s product). We model ψ (m, y, ω) by
ψ (m, y, ω) = B
my
E [y]Nad (ω)
−A
(
my
E [y]Nad (ω)
)2
, (2)
where B > 0 and A ≥ 0 are parameters. Eq. (2) means
that ψ (m, y, ω) is quadratic in myE[y]Nad(ω) . This reflects the
advertising’s wear-out effect: the advertising’s effectiveness
may first increase and then decrease with the number of ads
delivered by this advertiser to the user. This is because too
much repetition may lead the user to have a bad impression
of the product. The wear-out effect has been widely observed
in the literature [15], [16]. Some studies, such as [33] and
[34], explicitly considered a quadratic relation between the ad
repetition and the advertising’s effectiveness, which is similar
to (2). Note that a larger A in (2) reflects a stronger degree of
wear-out effect.8
7In Example 1 in Section III-B, we will compute the concrete distribution
of y given the assumption of θ. Moreover, the distribution of y depends on
the operator’s decision ω. For the simplicity of presentation, we omit this
dependence in the notation.
8When advertising its product, the advertiser can make several different
versions of ads, and fill the m purchased ad slots with them. This can reduce
A, as it mitigates the feeling of repetition from the perspective of the users.
We define an advertiser’s utility as the expected total value
of its advertising’s effectiveness on all users. If a user does
not see the advertiser’s ads, the advertising’s effectiveness
on the user is zero. Therefore, an advertiser’s utility is
simply Ey [ψ (m, y, ω)]Nad (ω). Considering the advertiser’s
payment for purchasing m ad slots, the advertiser’s payoff is
Πad (m,ω, p) = Ey [ψ (m, y, ω)]Nad (ω)−mp
(a)
= Ey
[
Bmy
E [y]Nad (ω)
− Am
2y2
(E [y]Nad (ω))2
]
Nad (ω)−mp
= (B − p)m− AE
[
y2
]
(E [y])2Nad (ω)
m2. (3)
Note that E [y]Nad (ω) and
(
E [y]Nad (ω)
)2
in the denomi-
nators on the right-hand side of equality (a) are deterministic.
When Nad (ω) = 0, we simply define Πad (m,ω, p) ,
−mp, and it is easy to see that the advertiser will not purchase
any ad slot in this case.
D. Two-Stage Stackelberg Game
We model the interactions among the operator, users, and
advertisers by a two-stage Stackelberg game. In Stage I, the
operator decides the unit data reward ω and ad price p. In
Stage II, each type-θ user chooses the subscription decision r
and the number of watched ads x, and each advertiser decides
the number of purchased ad slots m.9
We assume that the users’ maximum valuation θmax satisfies
θmax >
u′(0)F
u′(Q)u(Q) . Similar assumptions about the range of
users’ attributes have been made in [35]–[37]. As shown in
Sections III and IV, this assumption implies that the high-
valuation users may both subscribe to the data plan and watch
ads under a small reward ω. In fact, we can easily see that the
user equilibrium under θmax ≤ u
′(0)F
u′(Q)u(Q) will be a special case
of that under θmax >
u′(0)F
u′(Q)u(Q) . We summarize our paper’s
key notations in Appendix A.
III. SUBSCRIPTION-AWARE REWARDING
In this section, we analyze the two-stage game under the
SAR scheme, i.e., the operator only allows the subscribers of
the data plan to watch ads for rewards. Note that we do not
study the scheme which only rewards the non-subscribers for
watching ads. This scheme is less reasonable in practice, i.e.,
the subscribers should not have a lower priority of using the
service than the non-subscribers.
A. Users’ Decisions in Stage II
Given ω, a type-θ user solves the following problem:
max
r∈{0,1}, x∈[0,∞)
Πuser (θ, r, x, ω) , s.t. x = xr, (4)
where Πuser (θ, r, x, ω) is given in (1), and x = xr implies that
a user can watch ads (x > 0) only if it subscribes (r = 1).
9If we break Stage II into two stages and consider the sequential decision
making of the advertisers and users, the game’s outcome will not change.
This is because given the operator’s unit data reward, the users’ decisions are
not directly affected by the advertisers’ decisions. Hence, the advertisers can
anticipate the users’ decisions, regardless of their decision sequence.
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Fig. 2: Illustration of data obtained under the SAR scheme (based on
Proposition 1). For u (z) = ln (1 + z), the amount of data obtained via
watching ads (i.e., ωx∗ (θ, ω)) linearly increases with θ when x∗ (θ, ω) > 0.
The red arrows indicate the change of θ1 and θ2 as ω increases.
We use (u′)−1 (·) to denote the inverse function of u′ (·). In
Lemma 1, we introduce several thresholds of θ, which will be
used to characterize the users’ decisions (due to space limits,
we leave all proofs in our appendices).
Lemma 1. Define θ0 , Fu(Q) and θ1 ,
Φ
ωu′(Q) . When ω ∈(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(Q) ,∞
)
, there is a unique θ ∈ (θ1, θ0) that satisfies
θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))− F − Φω ((u′)−1 ( Φωθ )−Q) = 0, and we
denote it by θ2.
Although θ1, θ2 in Lemma 1 (and θ3, θ4 in Lemma 2)
are functions of ω, we omit this dependence in the notation
to simplify the presentation. Based on these thresholds, we
characterize the users’ decisions in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under the SAR scheme, the optimal decisions
of a type-θ user (θ ∈ [0, θmax]) are as follows:10
Case A: When ω ∈
[
0, Φu′(Q)θmax
]
,
r∗ (θ, ω) = 1{θ≥θ0}, x
∗ (θ, ω) = 0;
Case B: When ω ∈
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
, Φu(Q)Fu′(Q)
]
,
r∗(θ, ω)=1{θ≥θ0}, x
∗(θ, ω)=
1
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
1{θ≥θ1};
Case C: When ω ∈
(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(Q) ,∞
)
,
r∗(θ, ω)=1{θ≥θ2}, x
∗(θ, ω)=
1
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
1{θ≥θ2}.
In Fig. 2, we illustrate the data that users with different val-
uations θ obtain from data plan subscriptions (i.e., Qr∗ (θ, ω))
and watching ads (i.e., ωx∗ (θ, ω)).
In Case A, only the users with θ ≥ θ0 subscribe, and no
user watches ads because of the small unit data reward ω.
In Case B, the users who subscribe are the same as those
in Case A. Users with θ ≥ θ1 watch ads, and the threshold θ1
decreases (i.e., more users watch ads) as ω increases. Next,
we focus on the users with θ ≥ θ1. We can show that the
number of watched ads x∗ (θ, ω) increases with θ (note that
10Here, 1{·} denotes the indicator function. It equals 1 if the event in
braces is true, and equals 0 otherwise.
(u′)−1 (·) is decreasing because of the strict concavity of
u (·)). In particular, the marginal increase of x∗ (θ, ω) with
respect to θ is affected by the utility function u (z):
• If u (z) = ln (1 + z), we can show that x∗ (θ, ω) linearly
increases with θ (as illustrated in Fig. 2);
• If u (z) = (z+µ)
1−α
1−α − µ
1−α
1−α , 0 < α < 1, µ ≥ 0, then
x∗ (θ, ω) convexly increases with θ;
• If u (z) = 1 − e−γz, γ > 0, then x∗ (θ, ω) concavely
increases with θ.
In Case C, more users subscribe compared with Cases A
and B, i.e., the subscription threshold θ2 is smaller than θ0.
This is because the unit reward ω is large and users with
θ ∈ [θ2, θ0) subscribe to be eligible for the data rewards.
In Appendix D, we prove that θ2 decreases (i.e., more users
subscribe) as ω increases. Moreover, each subscriber watches
a positive number of ads, i.e., x∗ (θ, ω) > 0 for θ ≥ θ2.
Based on these results, we can see one key advantage of
the SAR scheme: it leads to a large number of data plan
subscriptions.
B. Advertisers’ Decisions in Stage II
Given p and ω, each advertiser solves the following problem:
max
m∈[0,∞)
Πad (m,ω, p) , (5)
where the payoff Πad (m,ω, p) is given in (3). We characterize
the optimal number of purchased ad slots in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. If Nad (ω) = 0 or p ≥ B, then m∗ (ω, p) = 0;
otherwise,
m∗ (ω, p) =
B − p
2A
(E [y])2
E [y2]
Nad (ω) . (6)
Recall that the random variable y denotes the value of
x∗ (θ, ω) when x∗ (θ, ω) > 0, and Nad (ω) is the mass of users
watching ads. In (6), m∗ (ω, p) decreases with the degree of
wear-out effect A. Moreover, since E
[
y2
]
= (E [y])2+Var [y],
we can see that m∗ (ω, p) decreases with Var [y] (i.e., the
variance of y). This implies that the advertisers prefer a low
variation in the number of ads watched by each of the Nad (ω)
users. The reason is that the advertising’s effectiveness is
concave in y given E [y] (as shown in (2)).
Given the concrete utility function u (·) and the distribution
of θ, we can derive x∗ (θ, ω) based on Proposition 1, and
further compute E [y], E
[
y2
]
, and Nad (ω) in (6). We give an
example as follows.
Example 1. Suppose that u (z) = ln (1 + z), θ is uniformly
distributed in [0, θmax], and ω satisfies Case B in Proposition
1, i.e., ω ∈
(
(1+Q)Φ
θmax
, ΦF (1 +Q) ln (1 +Q)
]
. Based on Propo-
sition 1, the users’ ad watching decisions are characterized as
follows:
x∗ (θ, ω) =
θ − θ1
Φ
1{θ≥θ1}, (7)
where θ1 =
Φ(1+Q)
ω . Hence, only the users with θ ≥ θ1
watch ads. Since θ is uniformly distributed in [0, θmax], we
6can further compute Nad (ω) as follows:
Nad (ω) =
θmax − θ1
θmax
N. (8)
According to (7) and the fact that θ ∼ U [0, θmax], the number
of ads watched by one of the Nad (ω) users is uniformly
distributed in
[
0, θmax−θ1Φ
]
. This implies that y is uniformly
distributed in
[
0, θmax−θ1Φ
]
.11 Then, we can compute E [y] and
E
[
y2
]
as follows:
E [y] =
1
2
θmax − θ1
Φ
,E
[
y2
]
=
1
3
(
θmax − θ1
Φ
)2
. (9)
Based on Proposition 2, we can derive m∗ (ω, p) as follows:
m∗ (ω, p) =
3
8
max {B − p, 0}
A
θmax − θ1
θmax
N. (10)
In Appendix F, we compute m∗ (ω, p) for other values of
ω (i.e., ω that satisfies Cases A or C) under the logarithmic
utility function and uniformly distributed user types.
C. Operator’s Decisions in Stage I
The operator obtains revenue from both the mobile data
market and ad market. In the mobile data market, each user
who subscribes to the data plan should pay F to the operator.
The operator’s corresponding revenue is
Rdata (ω) = NF
∫ θmax
0
r∗ (θ, ω) g (θ) dθ. (11)
In the ad market, each advertiser pays p for each purchased
ad slot. The operator’s corresponding revenue is
Rad (ω, p) = Km∗ (ω, p) p. (12)
Let D (ω) denote the total data demand, i.e., the total
amount of mobile data that users request (by subscription and
watching ads) under reward ω. We can compute D (ω) as
D (ω) = N
∫ θmax
0
(Qr∗ (θ, ω) + ωx∗ (θ, ω)) g (θ) dθ, (13)
where Qr∗ (θ, ω) and ωx∗ (θ, ω) are illustrated in Fig. 2.
Based on Rdata (ω), Rad (ω, p), and D (ω), we formulate
the operator’s problem as follows:
max
ω≥0,p>0
Rtotal (ω, p) , Rdata (ω) +Rad (ω, p) (14)
s.t. D (ω) ≤ C, (15)
Km∗ (ω, p) ≤ E [y]Nad (ω) . (16)
Here, Rtotal (ω, p) is the operator’s total revenue. Constraint
(15) implies that the total data demand D (ω) cannot exceed a
capacity C [17], [23]. To ensure that choosing ω = 0 (i.e., no
data reward) is feasible to the problem, we assume that C ≥
D (0). Here, D (0) is the data demand when the operator only
11Strictly speaking, x∗ (θ1, ω) = 0 and hence only the users with
θ > θ1 will watch ads. As a result, y should be uniformly distributed in(
0, θmax−θ1
Φ
]
. However, the probability that θ = θ1 is zero due to the
continuous distribution of θ. Therefore, we can consider users with θ ≥ θ1
when counting Nad (ω) and treat y as a variable uniformly distributed in[
0, θmax−θ1
Φ
]
without affecting our analysis.
offers the data plan without any data reward. Constraint (16)
implies that the total number of sold ad slots (i.e., Km∗ (ω, p))
should not exceed the number of available ad slots. When the
operator does not sell all ad slots, it can fill the unsold slots
with content like public news and pictures to guarantee the
fairness among the users choosing to watch ads (e.g., Optus
displayed wallpapers to users when there were unsold ad slots
[38]).
To solve (14)-(16), we first analyze p∗ (ω), which is the
optimal ad price under a given ω. Then, we substitute p =
p∗ (ω) into Rtotal (ω, p), and analyze the optimal unit data
reward ω∗. We characterize p∗ (ω) in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If ω ∈
[
0, Φu′(Q)θmax
]
, any positive price is
optimal; if ω ∈
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
,∞
)
,
p∗ (ω) = max
{
B
2
, B − 2AE
[
y2
]
KE [y]
}
. (17)
Note that the random variable y is the value of x∗ (θ, ω)
whenx∗ (θ, ω)>0. Hence, both E
[
y2
]
and E [y] depend on ω.
If ω ∈
[
0, Φu′(Q)θmax
]
, no user watches ads (based on Propo-
sition 1). In this case, the advertisers do not purchase ad slots,
regardless of the ad price p. If ω ∈
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
,∞
)
, Eq. (17)
implies that p∗ (ω) decreases with A (the degree of wear-out
effect) when A is small, but does not change with A when A is
large. When A < BKE[y]4E[y2] , the wear-out effect is small, and the
advertisers have high willingness to purchase ad slots. Hence,
the operator chooses p∗ (ω) = B − 2AE[y
2]
KE[y] to sell all the
ad slots (which leads to Km∗ (ω, p∗ (ω)) = E [y]Nad (ω)).
When A ≥ BKE[y]4E[y2] , the large wear-out effect decreases the
advertisers’ willingness to purchase slots. The operator will
not sell all slots, and will choose p∗ (ω) = B2 , which is
independent of A.
Next, we analyze ω∗, which maximizes Rtotal (ω, p∗ (ω)),
subject to D (ω) ≤ C. We first introduce Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Given C ≥ D (0), there is a unique ω ∈[
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
,∞
)
such that D (ω) = C. We denote this ω by
D−1 (C). Moreover, D−1 (C) strictly increases with C.
Based on Proposition 3, we can rewrite D (ω) ≤ C as ω ≤
D−1 (C). From numerical experiments, Rtotal (ω, p∗ (ω)) is
either always increasing or unimodal in ω ∈ [0,∞). Hence,
we can easily search for ω∗ in the interval
[
0, D−1 (C)
]
(e.g.,
when Rtotal (ω, p∗ (ω)) is unimodal, we can apply the Golden
Section method [39]). Next, we study when the operator will
choose ω to be D−1 (C), i.e., use up the network capacity for
data rewards. In Theorem 2, we show a sufficient condition
under which ω∗ = D−1 (C).
Theorem 2. Under the SAR scheme, if both (E[y])
2
E[y2] N
ad (ω)
and E [y]Nad (ω) increase with ω for ω ∈
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
,∞
)
,
the operator’s optimal unit data reward is given by ω∗ =
D−1 (C).
We explain this sufficient condition by discussing the unit
data reward ω’s influence on Rdata (ω) and Rad (ω, p∗ (ω)).
7First, increasing ω can increase Rdata (ω), because more users
subscribe. Second, increasing ω has the following impacts
on Rad (ω, p∗ (ω)): (i) (positive impact) It increases Nad (ω),
i.e., more users watch ads; (ii) (negative impact) It may
decrease E [y]. Under a larger ω, a user can obtain a larger
amount of data after watching a few ads. Then, the user’s
willingness to watch more ads may decrease because of the
concavity of the utility function; (iii) (negative impact) It may
increase Var [y]. Under a larger ω, more users with different
valuations θ watch ads, which can increase the variance of y.
As discussed in Section III-B, increasing Var [y] decreases
the advertisers’ willingness to purchase ad slots. Under a
general utility function u (·) and a general distribution of
θ, it is challenging to analyze the net effect of the above
impacts. Theorem 2 implies that when both (E[y])
2
E[y2] N
ad (ω) and
E [y]Nad (ω) increase with ω, the positive impact dominates
the negative impacts. In this case, the operator should set ω
as large as possible without violating the capacity constraint
(15) under the SAR scheme.
A widely considered setting is that each user has a log-
arithmic utility function (e.g., [29], [30]) and a uniformly
distributed type (e.g., [19], [36]). We can verify that this setting
satisfies the sufficient condition in Theorem 2, and hence we
have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. When u (z) = ln (1 + z) and θ ∼ U [0, θmax],
the operator’s optimal unit data reward is given by ω∗ =
D−1 (C).
When each user has an exponential utility function (i.e.,
u (z) = 1−e−γz), E [y]Nad (ω) may decrease with ω and ω∗
can be smaller than D−1 (C) (i.e., the operator does not use up
the capacity for rewards). We show an example in Appendix
K.
IV. SUBSCRIPTION-UNAWARE REWARDING
In this section, we consider the SUR scheme, i.e., both the
subscribers and non-subscribers can watch ads for rewards.
A. Users’ Decisions in Stage II
Since the users can watch ads without subscription, each
type-θ user simply chooses r and x to maximize its payoff
without the constraint x = xr, as in (4) in Section III-A.
In Lemma 2, we introduce two new thresholds of θ.
Lemma 2. Define θ3 , Φωu′(0) . When ω ∈
(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(0) ,
ΦQ
F
)
,
there is a unique θ ∈ (θ3, θ1) that satisfies θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))−
Φ
ω (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
= θu (Q)− F , and we denote it by θ4.
Recall that (u′)−1 (·) denotes the inverse function of u′ (·).
Based on the thresholds introduced in Lemmas 1 and 2, we
characterize the users’ decisions in the following proposition
(we use symbol ˆ to indicate that the results are obtained under
the SUR scheme).
Proposition 5. Under the SUR scheme, the optimal decisions
of a type-θ user (θ ∈ [0, θmax]) are as follows:
!" !#$%
& !'
($)*+(,
!-
!#$%
&
($)*+.,
!-
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/$0$+123#+?$0@A76B+$/)+
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Fig. 3: Illustration of data obtained under the SUR scheme (based on
Proposition 5). For u (z) = ln (1 + z), the amount of data obtained via
watching ads (i.e., ωxˆ∗ (θ, ω)) linearly increases with θ when xˆ∗ (θ, ω) > 0.
The red arrows indicate the change of θ1, θ3, and θ4 as ω increases.
Case Aˆ: When ω ∈
[
0, Φu′(Q)θmax
]
,
rˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 1{θ≥θ0}, xˆ
∗ (θ, ω) = 0;
Case Bˆ: When ω ∈
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
, Φu(Q)Fu′(0)
]
,
rˆ∗(θ, ω)=1{θ≥θ0},xˆ
∗(θ, ω)=
1
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
1{θ≥θ1};
Case Cˆ: When ω ∈
(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(0) ,
ΦQ
F
)
,
rˆ∗(θ,ω)=1{θ≥θ4},
xˆ∗(θ,ω)=
1
ω
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
1{θ3≤θ<θ4}+
1
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
1{θ≥θ1};
Case Dˆ: When ω ∈
[
ΦQ
F ,∞
)
,
rˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 0, xˆ∗ (θ, ω) =
1
ω
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
1{θ≥θ3}.
The users’ optimal decisions in Cases Aˆ and Bˆ are the same
as those in Cases A and B (under the SAR scheme), respec-
tively. Hence, in Fig. 3, we only illustrate the data obtained
by users via subscription (i.e., Qrˆ∗ (θ, ω)) and watching ads
(i.e., ωxˆ∗ (θ, ω)) in Cases Cˆ and Dˆ.
In Case Cˆ, two segments of users watch ads: users with
valuations θ ≥ θ1 watch ads and subscribe; users with
valuations θ3 ≤ θ < θ4 watch ads without subscription. We
characterize the properties of θ4 in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. When ω ∈
(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(0) ,
ΦQ
F
)
(i.e., Case Cˆ), (i) θ4 is
greater than θ0, and (ii) θ4 increases with ω.
In Case Bˆ, the subscription threshold is θ0. Hence, result
(i) of Lemma 3 implies that some low-valuation users who
subscribe in Case Bˆ become non-subscribers in Case Cˆ.
This is because these low-valuation users’ marginal benefit of
consuming data decreases after earning the data rewards, and
it is no longer beneficial for them to subscribe to the data plan
in Case Cˆ. Result (ii) of Lemma 3 shows that more subscribers
become non-subscribers as the unit reward increases.
In Case Dˆ, since ω is large, all users simply watch ads to
earn the rewards, without paying for the subscription.
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Fig. 4: Examples of Dˆ (ω) and Rˆtotal (ω, pˆ∗ (ω)): We assume that u (z) = 1− e−0.7z and obtain the distribution of θ by truncating the normal distribution
N (125, 30) to interval [0, 250]. We choose N = 107, F = 42, Q = 2, Φ = 0.5, K = 13, A = 1, B = 5, and C = 2.015× 107.
B. Advertisers’ Decisions in Stage II
Compared with the SAR scheme, the SUR scheme changes
each advertiser’s optimal decision through changing the mass
of users watching ads and the distribution of the number of
ads watched by each of these users.
Given rˆ∗ (θ, ω) and xˆ∗ (θ, ω) in Proposition 5, we can
compute Nˆad (ω) (i.e., the mass of users watching ads) and the
distribution of yˆ (i.e., xˆ∗ (θ, ω)’s value when xˆ∗ (θ, ω) > 0).
To compute mˆ∗ (ω, p), we can simply replace Nad (ω), E [y],
and E
[
y2
]
in Proposition 2 by Nˆad (ω), E [yˆ], and E
[
yˆ2
]
.
C. Operator’s Decisions in Stage I
Based on rˆ∗ (θ, ω), xˆ∗ (θ, ω), and mˆ∗ (ω, p), we can com-
pute Rˆdata (ω), Rˆad (ω, p), and Dˆ (ω) in a similar manner as
in (11)-(13). The operator’s problem in Stage I is then given
by:
max
ω≥0,p>0
Rˆtotal (ω, p) , Rˆdata (ω) + Rˆad (ω, p) (18)
s.t. Dˆ (ω) ≤ C, Kmˆ∗ (ω, p) ≤ Nˆad (ω)E [yˆ] , (19)
which is similar to problem (14)-(16).
To solve (18)-(19), we first compute pˆ∗ (ω), i.e., the optimal
ad price under a given ω. The analysis of pˆ∗ (ω) is similar to
that of p∗ (ω) in Theorem 1 under the SAR scheme. We can
prove that if ω ∈
[
0, Φu′(Q)θmax
]
, no user watches ads and
hence any positive ad price is optimal; otherwise, we have
pˆ∗ (ω) = max
{
B
2 , B −
2AE[yˆ2]
KE[yˆ]
}
.
Then, we compute ωˆ∗ by maximizing Rˆtotal (ω, pˆ∗ (ω)),
subject to Dˆ (ω) ≤ C. The computation of ωˆ∗ is differ-
ent from that of ω∗ under the SAR scheme, because (i)
Dˆ (ω) can be decreasing in ω ∈
(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(0) ,
ΦQ
F
)
, and (ii)
Rˆtotal (ω, pˆ∗ (ω)) is discontinuous at ω = ΦQF . Specifically,
when ω ∈
(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(0) ,
ΦQ
F
)
, increasing ω reduces the number
of data plan subscribers, which may decrease Dˆ (ω). More-
over, when ω increases to ΦQF , all data plan subscribers quit
their subscriptions and the distribution of users’ ad watch-
ing times also changes. This leads to the discontinuity of
Rˆtotal (ω, pˆ∗ (ω)) at ω = ΦQF . We illustrate examples of Dˆ (ω)
and Rˆtotal (ω, pˆ∗ (ω)) in Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b), respectively.
We can compute ωˆ∗ as follows. First, we search for ω’s
feasible region, where Dˆ (ω) ≤ C. We can numerically show
that ω’s feasible region consists of at most three intervals.
Then, we can show that Rˆtotal (ω, pˆ∗ (ω)) is either monotone
or unimodal in each interval.12 Hence, we can determine ωˆ∗
by comparing the local optimal unit data rewards found in
these intervals.
Under the SAR scheme, the operator always uses up the
capacity for rewards if u (z) = ln (1 + z) and θ ∼ U [0, θmax].
Under the SUR scheme, this does not hold, and a large ω may
even generate a total revenue that is lower than the revenue
when the operator does not offer any reward. This is because
a large ω may reduce the number of subscribers (as shown in
Case Cˆ) and hence decrease Rˆdata (ω). Next, we characterize
a sufficient condition under which the network capacity is not
used up for rewards (given general u (z) and g (θ)).
Theorem 3. Under the SUR scheme, when the network
capacity C > N (u′)−1
(
F
θmaxQ
)
and the degree of wear-out
effect A > B
2K
8F
∫ θmax
θ0
g(θ)dθ
, we have Dˆ (ωˆ∗) < C.
When the operator has a large capacity and the wear-
out effect is large, using up the capacity for rewards will
significantly decrease Rˆdata (ω) and will not significantly
increase Rˆad (ω, pˆ∗ (ω)). Hence, we have Dˆ (ωˆ∗) < C in this
situation. We can show that both thresholds N (u′)−1
(
F
θmaxQ
)
and B
2K
8F
∫ θmax
θ0
g(θ)dθ
decrease with F (i.e., the subscription fee).
Intuitively, if the data plan is expensive, the operator should
not use up the capacity for rewards under the SUR scheme.
12For example, in Fig. 4(a), ω’s feasible region consists of the yellow,
blue, and purple intervals (denoted by intervals (1), (2), and (3)). In Fig. 4(b),
Rˆtotal (ω, pˆ∗ (ω)) is increasing when ω is in the yellow or purple intervals,
and is decreasing when ω is in the blue interval.
9D. Extension: Differentiation of Ad Slots
In the above analysis, we assume that the operator does not
differentiate the ad slots generated by the users. It sells all
ad slots to the advertisers at the same price, and randomly
draws ads from all ad slots when a user watches ads. Under
the SUR scheme, the ad slots can be generated by both the
subscribers and non-subscribers. In this section, we consider
the differentiation of these two types of ad slots,13 which
affects both the pricing and ad display rule. The operator can
sell these two types of ad slots at different prices. When a
subscriber or non-subscriber watches ads, the operator draws
ads only from the corresponding type of ad slots (e.g., if
an advertiser only purchases the ad slots generated by the
subscribers, its ads will only be seen by the subscribers).
Given ω, we use NˆadI (ω) and Nˆ
ad
II (ω) to denote the number
of the subscribers that watch ads and the number of the non-
subscribers that watch ads, respectively. Let random variables
yˆI and yˆII denote the numbers of ads watched by one of these
subscribers and one of these non-subscribers, respectively.
Similar to Proposition 2, we have the following results:
• For the ad slots generated by the subscribers, the operator
can set a price pI > 0. If NˆadI (ω) > 0, the number of
these slots purchased by each advertiser is mˆ∗I (ω, pI) =
max{B−pI,0}
2A
(E[yˆI])2
E[yˆ2I ]
NˆadI (ω); otherwise, mˆ
∗
I (ω, pI) = 0;
• For the slots generated by the non-subscribers, the op-
erator can set pII > 0. If NˆadII (ω) > 0, the number of
these slots purchased by each advertiser is mˆ∗II (ω, pII) =
max{B−pII,0}
2A
(E[yˆII])2
E[yˆ2II]
NˆadII (ω); otherwise, mˆ
∗
II (ω, pII)= 0.
The operator’s problem with differentiation is given by:
max
ω≥0,pI,pII>0
Rˆdata(ω)+Kmˆ∗I (ω, pI) pI+Kmˆ
∗
II(ω, pII) pII (20)
s.t. Dˆ (ω) ≤ C, (21)
Kmˆ∗I (ω, pI) ≤ E [yˆI] NˆadI (ω) , (22)
Kmˆ∗II (ω, pII) ≤ E [yˆII] NˆadII (ω) . (23)
Constraint (22) means that the total number of sold ad slots
that correspond to the subscribers should not exceed the num-
ber of ad slots generated by the subscribers. Constraint (23)
can be explained similarly for the non-subscribers. In fact, only
when ω satisfies Case Cˆ in Proposition 5, both the subscribers
and non-subscribers watch ads (i.e., NˆadI (ω) , Nˆ
ad
II (ω) > 0),
and problem (20)-(23) is different from problem (18)-(19) (i.e.,
the problem without differentiation). In the remaining cases,
problem (20)-(23) reduces to problem (18)-(19).
We define ΠSUR , Rˆtotal (ωˆ∗, pˆ∗ (ωˆ∗)), which is the
optimal objective value of problem (18)-(19). Let ΠSURD
denote the optimal objective value of problem (20)-(23), i.e.,
ΠSURD is the operator’s optimal total revenue under the SUR
scheme with differentiation. We compare ΠSUR and ΠSURD
in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. We always have ΠSURD ≥ ΠSUR.
13Besides the subscription decision r, a user decides x, e.g., the number of
ads to watch within a month. Different from r, the operator does not precisely
know the user’s decision of x until the end of the month. If the operator can
estimate x’s range based on the user’s historical behavior, it can classify users
into different categories and differentiate the corresponding ad slots similarly.
Hence, differentiation does not decrease the operator’s op-
timal total revenue (given general u (z) and g (θ)). In general,
it is easy to show that allowing a seller to sell items at
different prices does not decrease its revenue. However, the
differentiation here affects the ad display rule as well as the
pricing, so it is non-trivial to prove Theorem 4. For example,
one conjecture is that given any (ω, p) which is feasible
to (18)-(19), the operator can choose the same ω and set
pI = pII = p in (20)-(23) to ensure that the value of objective
(20) is no smaller than that of (18). In fact, the conjecture does
not hold, because (ω, pI, pII) may be infeasible for (20)-(23).
Intuitively, if the optimal unit data reward satisfies Case Cˆ
and the distributions of yˆI and yˆII are significantly different,
the gap between ΠSURD and ΠSUR will be large. In the next
section, we will show this gap numerically.
V. COMPARISON BETWEEN REWARDING SCHEMES
We define ΠSAR , Rtotal (ω∗, p∗ (ω∗)), which is the
operator’s optimal total revenue under the SAR scheme. In
this section, we compare ΠSAR, ΠSUR, and ΠSURD. Since
the comparison is challenging under a general user type
distribution and a general utility function, we focus on specific
user type distributions and utility functions. In Sections V-A
and V-B, we consider uniformly distributed user types and
truncated normally distributed user types, respectively.
A. Uniformly Distributed User Types
In this section, we assume that each user’s type θ follows
a uniform distribution. We will consider logarithmic utility,
generalized α-fair utility, and exponential utility.
1) Logarithmic Utility Function: We assume that u (z) =
ln (1 + z). Theorem 5 characterizes the analytical comparison
between different schemes as C →∞.
Theorem 5. When θ ∼ U [0, θmax] and u (z) = ln (1 + z), if
network capacity C →∞, then ΠSAR > ΠSURD ≥ ΠSUR.
Theorem 5 implies that if the operator has sufficiently large
network capacity, it should only reward the subscribers for
watching ads. Intuitively, this allows the operator to motivate
all users to subscribe and watch ads via high data rewards. It
maximizes the operator’s revenue from both the data market
and the ad market.
Under a finite network capacity C, none of ΠSAR, ΠSUR, or
ΠSURD has a closed-form expression, and their analytical com-
parison is challenging. Next, we compare them numerically.
In the numerical experiment, we choose N = 107, F = 30,
Q = 0.8, θ ∼ U [0, 155], Φ = 0.3, K = 23, A = 0.6, and
B = 5. Here, we consider an area with 10 million users. In
Appendix R, we consider different parameter settings (e.g.,
different values of N ), and the key observations summarized
in this section still hold under those settings.
In Fig. 5(a), we plot ΠSAR, ΠSUR, and ΠSURD against C.
We can see that only ΠSAR strictly increases with C. As shown
in Proposition 4, when each user has a logarithmic utility
and a uniformly distributed type, the operator always uses up
the capacity for rewards under the SAR scheme. Hence, the
operator can always benefit from C’s increase in this situation.
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(a) Logarithmic Utility.
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(b) Generalized α-Fair Utility.
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(c) Exponential Utility (Large A).
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(d) Exponential Utility (Small A).
Fig. 5: ΠSAR, ΠSUR, and ΠSURD Under Different Network Capacity (Uniformly Distributed θ).
First, we compare ΠSAR and ΠSUR. When C is close
to D (0), ΠSAR and ΠSUR are equal. In this situation, the
operator can only choose a very small unit reward ω. As shown
in Case B in Proposition 1 and Case Bˆ in Proposition 5, the
users’ optimal decisions under the two schemes are the same,
which leads to the same operator’s revenue. When C is from
0.84 × 107 to 1.54 × 107, ΠSAR is smaller than ΠSUR. This
is because the SUR scheme can motivate two segments of
users to watch ads (by setting ω ∈
(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(0) ,
ΦQ
F
)
, as shown in
Case Cˆ in Proposition 5), which generates a higher ad revenue
than the SAR scheme. When C is greater than 1.54 × 107,
ΠSAR is greater than ΠSUR. The operator will fully utilize
the large network capacity under the SAR scheme, and set a
large ω to motivate more users to both subscribe and watch
ads. This is consistent with Theorem 5 (i.e., if C →∞, then
ΠSAR > ΠSUR). We summarize the results in Observation 1
(the comparison between ΠSAR and ΠSURD is similar to the
comparison between ΠSAR and ΠSUR).
Observation 1. When u (z) = ln (1 + z), if C is small, the
SUR scheme achieves a higher operator’s revenue; otherwise,
the SAR scheme achieves a higher operator’s revenue.
Second, we compare ΠSUR and ΠSURD. When C =
1.24 × 107, Fig. 5(a) shows that the ad slots’ differentiation
can improve the operator’s revenue under the SUR scheme
by 9.4%. This is because the value of ωˆ∗ under the SUR
scheme satisfies Case Cˆ in Proposition 5, which implies that
both subscribers and non-subscribers watch ads. Moreover,
the subscribers and non-subscribers have quite different ad
watching behaviors. In Fig. 6(a), we illustrate the distributions
of yˆI (i.e., the number of ads watched by a subscriber) and yˆII
(i.e., the number of ads watched by a non-subscriber) when
C = 1.24 × 107 and the operator uses the SUR scheme. We
can see that both yˆI and yˆII follow uniform distributions, but
their mean values are significantly different.
2) Generalized α-Fair Utility Function: We assume that
u (z) = (z+µ)
1−α
1−α − µ
1−α
1−α . We choose α = 0.8 and µ =
0.8, and the other settings are the same as those in Fig. 5(a).
In Fig. 5(b), we plot ΠSAR, ΠSUR, and ΠSURD against C.
We can see that the comparison among the operator’s optimal
revenues under different schemes is similar to that in Fig. 5(a).
We summarize the key results about the comparison between
ΠSAR and ΠSUR in the following observation.
Observation 2. When u (z) = (z+µ)
1−α
1−α − µ
1−α
1−α , if C is small,
the SUR scheme achieves a higher operator’s revenue; other-
wise, the SAR scheme achieves a higher operator’s revenue.
3) Exponential Utility Function: We assume that u (z) =
1 − e−γz , and choose γ = 0.7, N = 107, F = 45, Q = 2,
θ ∼ U [0, 250], Φ = 0.3, K = 23, and B = 5. In Fig. 5(c)
and Fig. 5(d), we show the comparison between ΠSAR, ΠSUR,
and ΠSURD under different degrees of the wear-out effect.
In Fig. 5(c), we consider a large wear-out effect (A = 0.9).
The comparison between ΠSAR and ΠSUR (or ΠSURD) is
similar to those in Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b). The SAR scheme
achieves a higher revenue than the SUR scheme when C is
large. Comparing ΠSUR and ΠSURD in Fig. 5(c), we observe
that differentiation improves the operator’s revenue under the
SUR scheme by at most 9.9%.
In Fig. 5(d), we consider a small wear-out effect (A =
0.2), and have three observations. First, ΠSAR may not change
with C, which is different from the logarithmic utility situation
shown in Fig. 5(a). When each user has an exponential utility,
the operator may not benefit from the increase of C, since
it may not use up the capacity for the rewards (as discussed
in Section III-C). Second, ΠSAR is always no greater than
ΠSUR (even under a large C), which is different from the
logarithmic utility situation and the generalized α-fair utility
situation. Under the SAR scheme, each user has to pay the
subscription fee F > 0 before receiving the data rewards. The
exponential utility function is upper bounded (i.e., u (z) =
1 − e−γz ≤ 1), and hence the users with θ < F will never
subscribe and watch ads under the SAR scheme, regardless of
the unit data reward ω. When A is small, the advertisers are
willing to buy more slots, and having more users watching
ads significantly increases the operator’s revenue. Therefore,
the SUR scheme, which can motivate the users with θ < F to
watch ads, achieves a higher revenue than the SAR scheme.
Third, the ΠSURD curve overlaps the ΠSUR curve, because the
operator chooses a large ω to incentivize the users to watch
ads under a small A. In this situation, all the ad slots are
generated by non-subscribers under the SUR scheme (see Case
Dˆ of Proposition 5), and the differentiation cannot improve the
operator’s revenue.
We summarize the key observations below.
Observation 3. When u (z) = 1− e−γz , (i) under a large A,
the SUR scheme achieves a higher operator revenue than the
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Fig. 6: Probability Distribution Function of yˆI and yˆII.
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(a) Logarithmic Utility.
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(b) Generalized α-Fair Utility.
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(c) Exponential Utility (Large A).
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(d) Exponential Utility (Small A).
Fig. 7: ΠSAR, ΠSUR, and ΠSURD Under Different Network Capacity (Truncated Normally Distributed θ).
SAR scheme if and only if C is below a finite threshold; (ii)
under a small A, the SUR scheme always achieves a higher
operator revenue than the SAR scheme.
B. Truncated Normally Distributed User Types
We next assume that each user’s type θ follows a truncated
normal distribution. We show that most observations under the
uniformly distributed user types still hold.
1) Logarithmic Utility Function: We assume that u (z) =
ln (1 + z), and obtain the distribution of θ by truncating the
normal distribution N (75, 40) to interval [0, 150]. We choose
N = 107, F = 40, Q = 2, Φ = 0.03, K = 8, A = 0.5,
and B = 10. In Fig. 7(a), we plot ΠSAR, ΠSUR, and ΠSURD
against C. We can see that the SUR scheme outperforms the
SAR scheme if and only if C is below a threshold. This is
consistent with Observation 1.
2) Generalized α-Fair Utility Function: We next assume
that u (z) = (z+µ)
1−α
1−α − µ
1−α
1−α , where α = 0.8 and µ = 0.8.
The other settings are the same as those in Fig. 7(a). We plot
the operator’s optimal revenues under different schemes in Fig.
7(b). The influence of C on the comparison is consistent with
Observation 2.
3) Exponential Utility Function: We next assume that
u (z) = 1−e−γz , and obtain the distribution of θ by truncating
the normal distribution N (125, 30) to interval [0, 250]. We
choose γ = 0.7, N = 107, F = 40, Q = 2, Φ = 0.5,
K = 16, and B = 5. Fig. 7(c) and Fig. 7(d) show the
comparison between ΠSAR, ΠSUR, and ΠSURD under A = 0.9
and A = 0.2, respectively.
Fig. 7(c) shows that if the wear-out effect is large, the
SUR scheme outperforms the SAR scheme under a small C.
Fig. 7(d) shows that if the wear-out effect is small, the SUR
scheme always outperforms the SAR scheme. These results
are consistent with Observation 3.
In Fig. 7(c), when C = 2.07 × 107, the differentiation of
the ad slots improves the operator’s revenue under the SUR
scheme by 20.3%. To explain this large improvement, we
illustrate the distributions of yˆI and yˆII under C = 2.07× 107
and the SUR scheme in Fig. 6(b). We can observe that the
difference between the two distributions is greater than that in
Fig. 6(a) (where each user has a logarithmic utility function
and a uniformly distributed type). For example, the value of
E[yˆII]
E[yˆI] in Fig. 6(b) is around 5.7, and the value of
E[yˆI]
E[yˆII] in Fig.
6(a) is around 2.9.14 Intuitively, when the difference between
the subscribers’ and non-subscribers’ ad watching behaviors is
larger, the benefit of differentiation is more obvious. Therefore,
the improvement of ΠSURD over ΠSUR in Fig. 7(c) is greater
than the improvement in Fig. 5(a) (which is 9.4%).
VI. CONCLUSION
Mobile data rewarding is an emerging approach to monetize
mobile services. We modeled the data rewarding ecosystem
14Note that E [yˆI] can be either larger or smaller than E [yˆII], which depends
on the parameter settings and the assumptions on the utility function and user
type distribution.
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and analyzed an operator’s rewarding scheme. Our results
reveal that: (i) increasing the unit data reward may decrease
the number of ads watched by the users, and the operator
may not use up its network capacity to reward the users; (ii)
under the SUR scheme, the operator can improve its revenue
by differentiating the ad slots generated by the subscribers and
non-subscribers; (iii) the operator’s optimal choice between the
SAR and SUR schemes is sensitive to the user utility function,
network capacity, and advertising’s wear-out effect.
In future work, we plan to first study the operator’s joint
optimization of the data plan and the data rewards. Under the
SAR scheme, the operator can reduce the subscription fee to
motivate more users to subscribe and watch ads. Under the
SUR scheme, the operator may increase the subscription fee,
which (i) extracts more revenue from the users with high θ and
(ii) pushes more users with low θ to become non-subscribers
and watch ads. Second, we are interested in relaxing the
assumptions of a monopolistic operator and homogeneous
advertisers. For example, when there are multiple operators,
they will compete for users as well as advertisers, which may
increase the unit data rewards and reduce the ad prices. Third,
we can study a general data rewarding scheme where the
operator can set different unit data rewards for the subscribers
and non-subscribers. The SAR and SUR schemes can be
treated as two special cases of this general scheme.
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NOTATION TABLE
We summarize the key notations in Table II.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof. We define function h (θ) as
h (θ) , θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))
− F − Φ
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
.
(24)
First, we compute its derivative. Note that we have
u′
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))
= Φωθ . Next, we apply the chain rule to
compute dh(θ)dθ . After the cancellation of the same terms, we
get the following result:
dh (θ)
dθ
= u
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))
. (25)
Note that function u (·) is strictly concave and
limz→∞ u′ (z) = 0. This implies that u′ (·) is a strictly
decreasing function. As a result, (u′)−1 (·), which is
the inverse function of u′ (·), is also a strictly decreasing
function. Based on this result and the fact that u (·) is a strictly
increasing function, we can see that dh(θ)dθ is strictly increasing
in θ. Furthermore, when θ = θ1 = Φωu′(Q) , the value of
dh(θ)
dθ is given by
dh(θ)
dθ = u
(
(u′)−1 (u′ (Q))
)
= u (Q).
Since u (0) = 0, Q > 0, and u (·) is strictly increasing, we
can conclude that dh(θ)dθ |θ=θ1 > 0. Hence, dh(θ)dθ > 0 for
θ ≥ θ1 = Φωu′(Q) .
Second, we compute h (θ1). By substituting θ1 = Φωu′(Q)
into h (θ), we have
h (θ1) =
Φ
ωu′ (Q)
u (Q)− F. (26)
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TABLE II: Key Notations.
Parameters
F > 0 Subscription fee of data plan
Q > 0 Amount of data included in data plan
N > 0 Mass of users
Φ > 0 A user’s disutility of watching one ad
K > 0 Number of advertisers
A ≥ 0, B > 0 Coefficients in (2) capturing advertis-
ing’s effectiveness. A is the degree of
wear-out effect.
C ≥ D (0) Network capacity
Decision Variables
ω ∈ [0,∞) Operator’s unit data reward
p ∈ (0,∞) Operator’s ad price
r ∈ {0, 1} A user’s subscription decision
x ∈ [0,∞) Number of ads that a user watches
m ∈ [0,∞) Number of ad slots that an advertiser
purchases
Random Variables
θ ∈ [0, θmax] A user’s valuation for mobile service
y Number of ads watched by a user who
chooses to watch ads (i.e., x∗(θ, ω)>0)
Functions
g (θ) Probability density function of θ
u (·) A user’s utility function
Πuser (θ, r, x, ω) A type-θ user’s payoff function
Nad (ω) Mass of users who watch ads (i.e., with
x∗ (θ, ω) > 0)
Πad (m,ω, p) An advertiser’s payoff function
Rdata (ω) Operator’s revenue from data market
Rad (ω, p) Operator’s ad revenue
Rtotal (ω, p) Operator’s total revenue
D (ω) Total data demand
Other Notations
ΠSAR Operator’s optimal total revenue under
SAR scheme
ΠSUR, ΠSURD Operator’s optimal total revenues under
SUR scheme. ΠSUR: no ad slot differ-
entiation; ΠSURD: with ad slot differen-
tiation.
When ω > Φu(Q)Fu′(Q) , we can see that h (θ1) < 0.
Third, we compute h (θ0). By substituting θ0 = Fu(Q) into
h (θ), we have
h (θ0) =
F
u (Q)
u
(
(u′)−1
(
Φu (Q)
ωF
))
− F
− Φ
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φu (Q)
ωF
)
−Q
)
. (27)
Next, we compare h (θ0) with 0. We define a new function
∆ (F ) as follows:
∆ (F ) =
F
u (Q)
u
(
(u′)−1
(
Φu (Q)
ωF
))
− F
− Φ
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φu (Q)
ωF
)
−Q
)
. (28)
We can compute ∆
(
Φu(Q)
ωu′(Q)
)
= ∆ (F ) |
F=
Φu(Q)
ωu′(Q)
as
∆
(
Φu (Q)
ωu′ (Q)
)
=
Φ
ωu′ (Q)
u
(
(u′)−1 (u′ (Q))
)
− Φu (Q)
ωu′ (Q)
− Φ
ω
(
(u′)−1 (u′ (Q))−Q
)
=
Φu (Q)
ωu′ (Q)
− Φu (Q)
ωu′ (Q)
= 0. (29)
Then, we analyze d∆(F )dF . We compute
d∆(F )
dF as follows:
d∆ (F )
dF
=
1
u (Q)
u
(
(u′)−1
(
Φu (Q)
ωF
))
− 1. (30)
Recall that u (·) is strictly increasing and (u′)−1 (·) is strictly
decreasing. Hence, d∆(F )dF is strictly increasing in F . More-
over, we can compute d∆(F )dF |F= Φu(Q)
ωu′(Q)
as d∆(F )dF |F= Φu(Q)
ωu′(Q)
=
1
u(Q)u
(
(u′)−1 (u′ (Q))
)
− 1 = 0. Therefore, we can see
that d∆(F )dF is zero when F =
Φu(Q)
ωu′(Q) and is positive when
F > Φu(Q)ωu′(Q) . Combining this result and ∆ (F ) |F= Φu(Q)
ωu′(Q)
= 0
in (29), we can conclude that ∆ (F ) > 0 for F > Φu(Q)ωu′(Q) .
Because ∆ (F ) equals h (θ0), we have h (θ0) > 0 when
ω > Φu(Q)Fu′(Q) .
When ω > Φu(Q)Fu′(Q) , we have proved that
dh(θ)
dθ > 0 for
θ ≥ θ1, h (θ1) < 0, and h (θ0) > 0. Hence, there exists a
unique θ2 ∈ (θ1, θ0) satisfying h (θ2) = 0.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof. Step 1: We analyze Case A, i.e., ω ∈
[
0, Φu′(Q)θmax
]
.
Suppose a type-θ user subscribes to the data plan, i.e., r = 1.
Its payoff is Πuser (θ, 1, x, ω) = θu (Q+ ωx)− F − Φx. We
can see that
∂Πuser (θ, 1, x, ω)
∂x
= θωu′ (Q+ ωx)− Φ
≤ u
′ (Q+ ωx) θ
u′ (Q) θmax
Φ− Φ. (31)
Since u′ (·) is a strictly decreasing function, we have
u′ (Q+ ωx) < u′ (Q) for x > 0. Hence, ∂Π
user(θ,1,x,ω)
∂x < 0
for x > 0. This implies that if a user subscribes to the data
plan, it will not watch any ad for rewards. In this case, the
user’s payoff is θu (Q)− F .
Suppose a type-θ user does not subscribe, i.e., r = 0. Under
the SAR scheme, the user cannot watch ads for the rewards.
Hence, its payoff is 0.
Comparing θu (Q) − F and 0, we can see that a user
subscribes if and only if θ ≥ θ0 = Fu(Q) . Moreover, a user
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with any θ ∈ [0, θmax] will not watch ads. That is to say, we
have
r∗ (θ, ω) = 1{θ≥θ0}, x
∗ (θ, ω) = 0, θ ∈ [0, θmax] . (32)
Step 2: We analyze Case B, i.e., ω ∈
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
, Φu(Q)Fu′(Q)
]
.
Suppose a type-θ user subscribes to the data plan, i.e., r = 1.
Its payoff is Πuser (θ, 1, x, ω) = θu (Q+ ωx) − F − Φx. By
checking ∂Π
user(θ,1,x,ω)
∂x , we can see the following result:
(i) If θ ∈
[
0, Φωu′(Q)
)
, the user will not watch ads (i.e.,
x = 0), and its payoff will be θu (Q)− F ;
(ii) If θ ∈
[
Φ
ωu′(Q) , θmax
]
, the user will choose x =
1
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)−Q). Since θ ≥ Φωu′(Q) , the value of
1
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)−Q) is non-negative. Then, we can see that
the user’s payoff satisfies
Πuser
(
θ, 1,
1
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
, ω
)
≥Πuser (θ, 1, 0, ω)
=θu (Q)− F.
(33)
Since ω ≤ Φu(Q)Fu′(Q) , we have Φωu′(Q) ≥ Fu(Q) . Hence, for
a user with θ ≥ Φωu′(Q) , its payoff under r = 1 and x =
1
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)−Q) is non-negative.
Suppose a type-θ user does not subscribe, i.e., r = 0. Under
the SAR scheme, the user cannot watch ads for the rewards
and its payoff is 0.
Next, we can compare the choices of r = 1 and r = 0. Re-
call that Φωu′(Q) ≥ Fu(Q) . We discuss the choices of users with
θ ∈
[
0, Fu(Q)
)
, θ ∈
[
F
u(Q) ,
Φ
ωu′(Q)
)
, and θ ∈
[
Φ
ωu′(Q) , θmax
)
,
separately. If θ ∈
[
0, Fu(Q)
)
, the user has a higher payoff
under r = 0. As discussed above, it cannot watch ads. If
θ ∈
[
F
u(Q) ,
Φ
ωu′(Q)
)
, the user has a higher payoff under
r = 1, and it will not watch ads. If θ ∈
[
Φ
ωu′(Q) , θmax
)
,
the user has a higher payoff under r = 1, and it will choose
x = 1ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)−Q). Recall that we define θ0 = Fu(Q)
and θ1 = Φωu′(Q) . We can conclude that the following result
holds for θ ∈ [0, θmax]:
r∗ (θ, ω)=1{θ≥θ0}, x
∗(θ, ω)=
1
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
1{θ≥θ1}.
(34)
Step 3: We analyze Case C, i.e., ω ∈
(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(Q) ,∞
)
.
Suppose a type-θ user subscribes to the data plan, i.e., r = 1.
Its payoff is Πuser (θ, 1, x, ω) = θu (Q+ ωx) − F − Φx. By
checking ∂Π
user(θ,1,x,ω)
∂x , we can see the following result:
(i) If θ ∈
[
0, Φωu′(Q)
)
, the user will not watch ads (i.e.,
x = 0), and its payoff will be θu (Q)− F ;
(ii) If θ ∈
[
Φ
ωu′(Q) , θmax
]
, the user will choose x =
1
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)−Q). Since θ ≥ Φωu′(Q) , the value of
1
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)−Q) is non-negative. The user’s correspond-
ing payoff is given by
Πuser (θ, 1, x, ω) =θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))
− F
− Φ
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
(35)
Suppose a type-θ user does not subscribe, i.e., r = 0. Under
the SAR scheme, the user cannot watch ads for the rewards
and its payoff is 0.
Next, we can compare the choices of r = 1 and r = 0. Since
ω > Φu(Q)Fu′(Q) , we have
Φ
ωu′(Q) <
F
u(Q) . If θ ∈
[
0, Φωu′(Q)
)
, the
user has a higher payoff under r = 0, and it cannot watch ads.
If θ ∈
[
Φ
ωu′(Q) , θ2
)
, we can see the following relation based
on our proof in Appendix B:
θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))
− F − Φ
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
< 0.
(36)
The left side is the value of Πuser (θ, 1, x, ω) in (35). The
inequality implies that the user has a higher payoff under r =
0. In this case, it cannot watch ads.
If θ ∈ [θ2, θmax], we can see the following relation based
on our proof in Appendix B:
θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))
− F − Φ
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
≥ 0.
(37)
This implies that the user has a higher payoff under r = 1.
In this case, it chooses x = 1ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)−Q). We can
conclude that the following result holds for θ ∈ [0, θmax]:
r∗(θ, ω)=1{θ≥θ2}, x
∗(θ, ω)=
1
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
1{θ≥θ2}.
(38)
Hence, we have proved r∗ (θ, ω) and x∗ (θ, ω) for Case A,
Case B, and Case C.
APPENDIX D
θ2’S MONOTONICITY WITH RESPECT TO ω
We prove that in Case C, θ2 decreases as ω increases.
Proof. Based on θ2’s definition, we have
θ2u
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ2
))
− F − Φ
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ2
)
−Q
)
= 0.
(40)
For both sides of the equation, we take their derivatives with
respect to ω, and get equation (39). After rearrangement, we
have the following equation:
dθ2
dω
u
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ2
))
+
Φ
ω2
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ2
)
−Q
)
= 0.
(41)
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dθ2
dω
u
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ2
))
+θ2u
′
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ2
)) d((u′)−1 ( Φωθ2))
dω
+
Φ
ω2
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ2
)
−Q
)
−Φ
ω
d
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ2
))
dω
= 0.
(39)
Hence, we can get the expression of dθ2dω as follows:
dθ2
dω
=
Φ
ω2
(
Q− (u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ2
))
u
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ2
)) . (42)
Based on θ2’s definition, we have θ2 > θ1 = Φωu′(Q) .
Recall that (u′)−1 (·) is strictly decreasing. We can see that
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ2
)
> (u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ1
)
= Q. As a result, the value
of Φω2
(
Q− (u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ2
))
is negative, and the value of
u
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ2
))
is positive. Therefore, we can conclude that
dθ2
dω < 0.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof. First, we consider the case where Nad (ω) = 0, i.e.,
the mass of users watching ads is zero. Based on the advertiser
payoff’s definition, Πad (m,ω, p) = −mp. Since p > 0, none
of the advertisers will purchase the ad slots, i.e., m∗ (ω, p) =
0.
Second, we consider the case where Nad (ω) > 0. An
advertiser’s payoff is
Πad (m,ω, p) =
Ey
[
B
my
E [y]Nad (ω)
−A
(
my
E [y]Nad (ω)
)2]
Nad (ω)−mp.
(43)
After rearrangement, we have
Πad (m,ω, p) = − A
Nad (ω)
E
[
y2
]
(E [y])2
m2 + (B − p)m, (44)
which is a quadratic function of m ≥ 0. We can easily see
that
m∗ (ω, p) = max
{
(B − p)Nad (ω) (E [y])2
2AE [y2]
, 0
}
. (45)
Combining the analysis for Nad (ω) = 0 and Nad (ω) > 0,
we can see the following result: If Nad (ω) = 0 or p ≥ B, then
m∗ (ω, p) = 0; otherwise, m∗ (ω, p) = B−p2A
(E[y])2
E[y2] N
ad (ω).
APPENDIX F
EXAMPLE OF COMPUTING m∗ (ω, p)
In this section, we assume that each user has a logarithmic
utility function, i.e., u (z) = ln (1 + z), and a uniformly
distributed type, i.e., θ ∼ U [0, θmax]. We compute the value of
Nad (ω), the distribution of y, and the expression of m∗ (ω, p)
when ω satisfies Case A, Case B, and Case C.
Step 1: We consider Case A. Since u (z) = ln (1 + z), the
condition of ω in Case A becomes ω ∈
[
0, (1+Q)Φθmax
]
. In this
case, there is no user watching ads. Hence, Nad (ω) = 0. From
Proposition 2, we have m∗ (ω, p) = 0.
Step 2: We consider Case B. Since u (z) =
ln (1 + z), the condition of ω in Case B becomes
ω ∈
(
(1+Q)Φ
θmax
, ΦF (1 +Q) ln (1 +Q)
]
. Based on Proposition
1, the users’ ad watching decisions in Case B are characterized
by the following equation:
x∗ (θ, ω) =
1
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
1{θ≥θ1}
(a)
=
1
ω
(
θω
Φ
− 1−Q
)
1{θ≥θ1}
(b)
=
θ − θ1
Φ
1{θ≥θ1}. (46)
Here, equality (a) is due to u (z) = ln (1 + z), and equality (b)
is due to θ1 =
Φ(1+Q)
ω in Case B. Hence, only the users with
θ ≥ θ1 watch ads. Because θ ∼ U [0, θmax], we can compute
Nad (ω) as follows:
Nad (ω) =
θmax − θ1
θmax
N. (47)
Moreover, according to (46) and the fact that θ ∼ U [0, θmax],
we can see that the number of ads watched by one of the
Nad (ω) users is uniformly distributed in
[
0, θmax−θ1Φ
]
. This
implies that y is uniformly distributed in
[
0, θmax−θ1Φ
]
. Then,
we can compute E [y] and E
[
y2
]
as follows:
E [y] =
1
2
θmax − θ1
Φ
,E
[
y2
]
=
1
3
(
θmax − θ1
Φ
)2
. (48)
Based on Proposition 2, we can derive m∗ (ω, p)’s expression
as
m∗ (ω, p) =
3
8
max {B − p, 0}
A
θmax − θ1
θmax
N. (49)
Step 3: We consider Case C. Since u (z) =
ln (1 + z), the condition of ω in Case C becomes
ω ∈ (ΦF (1 +Q) ln (1 +Q) ,∞). Based on Proposition 1, the
users’ ad watching decisions in Case C are characterized by
the following equation:
x∗ (θ, ω) =
1
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
1{θ≥θ2}
=
θ − θ1
Φ
1{θ≥θ2}. (50)
Hence, only the users with θ ≥ θ2 watch ads. Because θ ∼
U [0, θmax], we can compute Nad (ω) as follows:
Nad (ω) =
θmax − θ2
θmax
N. (51)
17
Moreover, according to (50) and the fact that θ ∼ U [0, θmax],
we can see that the number of ads watched by one of the
Nad (ω) users is uniformly distributed in
[
θ2−θ1
Φ ,
θmax−θ1
Φ
]
.
This means that y is uniformly distributed in
[
θ2−θ1
Φ ,
θmax−θ1
Φ
]
.
Then, we can compute E [y] and E
[
y2
]
as follows:
E [y] =
θ2 − θ1 + θmax − θ1
2Φ
, (52)
E
[
y2
]
=
(
θ2 − θ1 + θmax − θ1
2Φ
)2
+
(
θmax−θ1−(θ2−θ1)
Φ
)2
12
.
(53)
To simplify the presentation, we let λa , θ2 − θ1 and λb ,
θmax − θ1. We can further have the following result:
(E [y])2
E [y2]
=
(
λa+λb
2Φ
)2(
λa+λb
2Φ
)2
+ 112
(
λb−λa
Φ
)2
=
3 (λa + λb)
2
3 (λa + λb)
2
+ (λb − λa)2
. (54)
Based on Proposition 2, we can derive m∗ (ω, p)’s expression
as
m∗ (ω, p)
=
max {B − p, 0}
2A
3 (λa + λb)
2
3 (λa + λb)
2
+ (λb − λa)2
θmax − θ2
θmax
N
=
max {B − p, 0}
2A
3 (λa + λb)
2
4λ2a + 4λ
2
b + 4λaλb
λb − λa
θmax
N
=
3 max {B − p, 0}
8A
N
θmax
(λa + λb)
2
λ2a + λ
2
b + λaλb
(λb − λa)2
λb − λa
=
3 max {B − p, 0}
8A
N
θmax
(
λ2b − λ2a
)2
λ3b − λ3a
=
3
8
max {B − p, 0}
A
N
θmax
(
(θmax − θ1)2 − (θ2 − θ1)2
)2
(θmax − θ1)3 − (θ2 − θ1)3
.
(55)
This completes our analysis of m∗ (ω, p) under three cases
when u (z) = ln (1 + z) and θ ∼ U [0, θmax].
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof. First, we consider the case where ω ∈
[
0, Φu′(Q)θmax
]
.
According to Proposition 1, no user watches ads, i.e.,
Nad (ω) = 0. From Proposition 2, we can see that m∗ (ω, p) =
0 for any p > 0. This means that the operator’s ad revenue
Rad (ω, p) is zero, regardless of the ad price. Hence, all
positive prices lead to the same ad revenue, and any positive
price is optimal.
Second, we consider the case where ω ∈
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
,∞
)
.
From Proposition 1, the number of users watching ads is
positive, i.e., Nad (ω) > 0. If p ≥ B, the value of m∗ (ω, p)
is zero based on Proposition 2. In this situation, the value
of Rad (ω, p) is also zero. If p < B, we have m∗ (ω, p) =
B−p
2A
(E[y])2
E[y2] N
ad (ω). Then, when ω is given, the operator’s
problem of deciding p can be rewritten as follows:
max
p>0
K
B − p
2A
(E [y])2
E [y2]
Nad (ω) p (56)
s.t. K
B − p
2A
(E [y])2
E [y2]
Nad (ω) ≤ E [y]Nad (ω) . (57)
After rearrangement, the problem becomes:
max
p>0
K
B − p
2A
(E [y])2
E [y2]
Nad (ω) p (58)
s.t. p ≥ B − 2AE
[
y2
]
KE [y]
. (59)
The objective function is quadratic in p and achieves the
maximum value at p = B2 . Hence, we can see that the optimal
price under a given ω is given by
p∗ (ω) = max
{
B
2
, B − 2AE
[
y2
]
KE [y]
}
. (60)
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Proof. Step 1: We analyze the monotonicity of D (ω) in three
cases.
First, when ω ∈
[
0, Φu′(Q)θmax
]
, the value of D (ω) is given
by
D (ω) = NQ
∫ θmax
θ0
g (θ) dθ = NQ
∫ θmax
F
u(Q)
g (θ) dθ, (61)
which is independent of ω.
Second, when ω ∈
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
, Φu(Q)Fu′(Q)
]
, the expression of
D (ω) is given by
D (ω) =NQ
∫ θmax
F
u(Q)
g (θ) dθ
+N
∫ θmax
Φ
ωu′(Q)
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
g (θ) dθ. (62)
Based on Leibniz’s rule, we can further compute dD(ω)dω as
follows:
dD (ω)
dω
= N
∫ θmax
Φ
ωu′(Q)
d
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))
dω
g (θ) dθ
−N
d
(
Φ
ωu′(Q)
)
dω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ω Φωu′(Q)
)
−Q
)
g
(
Φ
ωu′ (Q)
)
= N
∫ θmax
Φ
ωu′(Q)
d
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))
dω
g (θ) dθ. (63)
From our proof in Lemma 1, function (u′)−1 (·) is strictly
decreasing. Hence,
d
(
(u′)
−1
( Φωθ )
)
dω is positive. This implies that
dD(ω)
dω is positive.
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Third, when ω ∈
(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(Q) ,∞
)
, the expression of D (ω) is
given by
D (ω) =NQ
∫ θmax
θ2
g (θ) dθ
+N
∫ θmax
θ2
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
g (θ) dθ. (64)
We can further compute dD(ω)dω as follows:
dD (ω)
dω
=−NQg (θ2) dθ2
dω
+N
∫ θmax
θ2
d
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))
dω
g (θ)dθ
−N
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ2
)
−Q
)
g (θ2)
dθ2
dω
. (65)
From our proof in Appendix D, we have dθ2dω < 0. Hence, the
first term in the right side of (65) is positive. Since function
(u′)−1 (·) is strictly decreasing, we have d
(
(u′)
−1
( Φωθ )
)
dω > 0.
Hence, the second term in the right side of (65) is positive.
Furthermore, from the definition of θ2, we have θ2 > θ1 =
Φ
ωu′(Q) . As a result, the value of (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ2
)
−Q is positive.
Considering that dθ2dω < 0, the third term in the right side of
(65) is positive. Based on the above analysis, we can see that
dD(ω)
dω > 0.
Step 2: We analyze the continuity of D (ω). Since u (·)
is twice differentiable, we can see that D (ω) is continuous
for ω ∈
[
0, Φu′(Q)θmax
)
, ω ∈
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
, Φu(Q)Fu′(Q)
)
, and ω ∈(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(Q) ,∞
)
, based on (61), (62), and (64). Next, we analyze
the continuity of D (ω) at ω = Φu′(Q)θmax and ω =
Φu(Q)
Fu′(Q) .
When ω = Φu′(Q)θmax , the value of
Φ
ωu′(Q) equals θmax.
Based on (62), we can compute limω↘ Φ
u′(Q)θmax
D (ω) as
lim
ω↘ Φ
u′(Q)θmax
D (ω) = NQ
∫ θmax
F
u(Q)
g (θ) dθ.
From (61), we can see that this equals D (ω) |ω= Φ
u′(Q)θmax
.
Based on (61), we can also see that limω↗ Φ
u′(Q)θmax
D (ω) =
D (ω) |ω= Φ
u′(Q)θmax
. Hence, D (ω) is continuous at ω =
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
.
Then, we analyze the continuity of D (ω) at ω = Φu(Q)Fu′(Q) .
Recall that θ0 = Fu(Q) and θ1 =
Φ
ωu′(Q) . We can see that
lim
ω↘ Φu(Q)
Fu′(Q)
θ1 = θ0. According to the definition of θ2,
we have θ2 ∈ (θ1, θ0). Hence, we have the relation that
lim
ω↘ Φu(Q)
Fu′(Q)
θ2 = limω↘ Φu(Q)
Fu′(Q)
θ1 = θ0. Based on this
relation, (62), and (64), we can derive the following equation:
lim
ω↘ Φu(Q)
Fu′(Q)
D (ω) = D (ω) |
ω=
Φu(Q)
Fu′(Q)
. (66)
From (62), we can also see that lim
ω↗ Φu(Q)
Fu′(Q)
D (ω) =
D (ω) |
ω=
Φu(Q)
Fu′(Q)
. Therefore, D (ω) is continuous at ω =
Φu(Q)
Fu′(Q) .
The above analysis shows that D (ω) is continuous for ω ≥
0.
Step 3: We prove that limω→∞D (ω) =∞.
First, we analyze limω→∞ (u′)
−1 ( Φ
ωθ
)
. Recall that u (·) is
strictly concave and limz→∞ u′ (z) = 0. We can see that as z
increases from 0 to ∞, the value of u′ (z) strictly decreases
from u′ (0) to 0. Hence, as zˆ increases from 0 to u′ (0), the
value of (u′)−1 (zˆ) strictly decreases from ∞ to 0. Hence,
we have limzˆ→0 (u′)
−1
(zˆ) = ∞. This implies the following
relation:
lim
ω→∞ (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
=∞. (67)
When ω > Φu(Q)Fu′(Q) , we can derive the following inequality
from (64):
D (ω) > N
∫ θmax
θ0
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
g (θ) dθ.
Recall that θ0 = Fu(Q) , which is independent of ω. From
(67), we can see that when ω → ∞, the right side of (68)
approaches infinity. Therefore, we have limω→∞D (ω) =∞.
So far, we have shown that (i) D (ω) is continuous
in ω ∈ [0,∞); (ii) D (ω) does not change with ω for
ω ∈
[
0, Φu′(Q)θmax
]
, and strictly increases with ω for ω ∈(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
,∞
)
; (iii) when ω approaches infinity, D (ω)
approaches infinity. Therefore, we can conclude that given
C ≥ D (0), there is a unique ω ∈
[
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
,∞
)
such that
D (ω) = C. Furthermore, this ω strictly increases with C.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. Step 1: We analyze the case where C = D (0). From
constraint D (ω) ≤ C, we can see that ω needs to satisfy
0 ≤ ω ≤ Φu′(Q)θmax . Based on Proposition 1, no user watches
ads in this case. As a result, the value of Nad (ω) is zero. From
Proposition 2, the value of m∗ (ω, p) is also zero. Based on
(14)-(16), we can easily see that the operator’s problem of
deciding ω becomes:
max
ω∈
[
0, Φ
u′(Q)θmax
]Rdata (ω) , (68)
where Rdata (ω) equals NF
∫ θmax
F
u(Q)
g (θ) dθ and is indepen-
dent of ω. Therefore, when C = D (0), any ω from set[
0, Φu′(Q)θmax
]
is optimal.
Next, we show that when C = D (0), the value of D−1 (C)
is in the set
[
0, Φu′(Q)θmax
]
. According to the definition of
D−1 (C) in Proposition 3, D−1 (C) takes the value from set[
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
,∞
)
. Since D (0) = D
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
)
, when C =
D (0), the value of D−1 (C) is Φu′(Q)θmax . Therefore, the value
of D−1 (C) is in the set
[
0, Φu′(Q)θmax
]
, and ω = D−1 (C) is
one optimal solution to the operator’s problem.
Step 2: We analyze the case where C > D (0). First, we
prove that ω∗ should lie in the interval
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
, D−1 (C)
]
.
If ω ∈
[
0, Φu′(Q)θmax
]
, no user watches ads (from our analysis
in Step 1). The operator’s revenue only consists of the revenue
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from the data market, and the value is NF
∫ θmax
F
u(Q)
g (θ) dθ. If
ω ∈
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
, D−1 (C)
]
, the operator can choose p∗ (ω) =
max
{
B
2 , B −
2AE[y2]
KE[y]
}
according to Theorem 1. Then, we
can easily verify that the operator’s revenue from the data
market is no less than NF
∫ θmax
F
u(Q)
g (θ) dθ and its ad revenue
is positive. As a result, when C > D (0), the value of ω∗
should be in the interval
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
, D−1 (C)
]
.
Since ω∗ ∈
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
, D−1 (C)
]
, we can utilize Propo-
sition 2 to simplify the operator’s optimization problem as
follows:
maxRdata (ω) +Kp
B − p
2A
(E [y])2
E [y2]
Nad (ω) (69)
s.t. K
B − p
2A
(E [y])2
E [y2]
Nad (ω) ≤ E [y]Nad (ω) (70)
var. ω ∈
(
Φ
u′ (Q) θmax
, D−1 (C)
]
, p > 0. (71)
We prove ω∗ = D−1 (C) by contradiction. Suppose that
ω∗ < D−1 (C) and the corresponding ad price is p∗ (ω∗).
Next, we prove that we can find (ω, p) that is feasible and
generates a higher total revenue than (ω∗, p∗ (ω∗)).
Since ω∗ < D−1 (C), we let ω˜ be a value in
(
ω∗, D−1 (C)
]
.
When the unit data reward is ω˜, the number of users watching
ads is Nad (ω˜). We use a random variable y˜ to denote the
number of ads watched by one of these Nad (ω˜) users under
the unit data reward ω˜. Then, we can choose p˜ to satisfy the
following equation:
B − p˜
2A
(E [y˜])2
E [y˜2]
Nad (ω˜) =
B − p∗ (ω∗)
2A
(E [y∗])2
E
[
(y∗)2
]Nad (ω∗) .
(72)
Here, we use a random variable y∗ to denote the number of
ads watched by one of the users choosing to watch ads under
the unit data reward ω∗.
Next, we prove that (ω˜, p˜) satisfies constraint (70). Based
on the feasibility of solution (ω∗, p∗ (ω∗)), the following
inequality holds:
K
B − p∗ (ω∗)
2A
(E [y∗])2
E
[
(y∗)2
]Nad (ω∗) ≤ E [y∗]Nad (ω∗) . (73)
One condition of Theorem 2 is that E [y]Nad (ω) increases
with ω for ω > Φu′(Q)θmax . From ω˜ > ω
∗, we have the
following relation:
E [y˜]Nad (ω˜) > E [y∗]Nad (ω∗) . (74)
Based on (73) and (74), we have the following result:
K
B − p∗ (ω∗)
2A
(E [y∗])2
E
[
(y∗)2
]Nad (ω∗) < E [y˜]Nad (ω˜) . (75)
From the above inequality and (72), we can derive the follow-
ing relation:
K
B − p˜
2A
(E [y˜])2
E [y˜2]
Nad (ω˜) < E [y˜]Nad (ω˜) . (76)
This implies that (ω˜, p˜) satisfies constraint (70).
Then, we prove that (ω˜, p˜) generates a larger objective
value than (ω∗, p∗ (ω∗)). One condition of Theorem 2 is that
(E[y])2
E[y2] N
ad (ω) increases with ω for ω > Φu′(Q)θmax . From
ω˜ > ω∗, we have the following relation:
(E [y˜])2
E [y˜2]
Nad (ω˜) >
(E [y∗])2
E
[
(y∗)2
]Nad (ω∗) . (77)
Based on this inequality and (72), we can see that
p˜ > p∗ (ω∗) . (78)
From p˜ > p∗ (ω∗) and (72), we can see that the ad revenue
under (ω˜, p˜) is greater than that under (ω∗, p∗ (ω∗)):
Kp˜
B − p˜
2A
(E [y˜])2
E [y˜2]
Nad (ω˜) >
Kp∗ (ω∗)
B − p∗ (ω∗)
2A
(E [y∗])2
E
[
(y∗)2
]Nad (ω∗) . (79)
Moreover, from Proposition 1 and ω˜ > ω∗, the number of
subscribers under unit reward ω˜ is no less than the num-
ber of subscribers under unit reward ω∗. This implies that
Rdata (ω˜) ≥ Rdata (ω∗). Combining (79) and Rdata (ω˜) ≥
Rdata (ω∗), we can conclude that (ω˜, p˜) generates a larger
objective value than (ω∗, p∗ (ω∗)).
Therefore, we have proved that (i) (ω˜, p˜) is feasible and (ii)
(ω˜, p˜) generates a larger objective value than (ω∗, p∗ (ω∗)).
This contradicts with the assumption that (ω∗, p∗ (ω∗)) is the
optimal solution. As a result, when the two conditions in
Theorem 2 hold, ω∗ should equal D−1 (C).
According to our results in Step 1 and Step 2, when the two
conditions in Theorem 2 hold, the optimal unit data reward is
given by ω∗ = D−1 (C).
APPENDIX J
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Proof. We prove that when u (z) = ln (1 + z) and θ ∼
U [0, θmax], both (E[y])
2
E[y2] N
ad (ω) and E [y]Nad (ω) increase
with ω for ω ∈
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
,∞
)
.
Step 1: We consider the case where ω ∈(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
, Φu(Q)Fu′(Q)
]
. Based on our analysis in Appendix F,
when u (z) = ln (1 + z) and θ ∼ U [0, θmax], we have the
following results:
θ1 =
Φ (1 +Q)
ω
,Nad (ω) =
θmax − θ1
θmax
N, (80)
E [y] =
1
2
θmax − θ1
Φ
,E
[
y2
]
=
1
3
(
θmax − θ1
Φ
)2
. (81)
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Hence, we can compute (E[y])
2
E[y2] N
ad (ω) as follows:
(E [y])2
E [y2]
Nad (ω) =
3
4
θmax − θ1
θmax
N, (82)
which increases with ω. Then, we can compute E [y]Nad (ω)
as follows:
E [y]Nad (ω) =
1
2
(θmax − θ1)2
Φθmax
N, (83)
which also increases with ω.
Step 2: We consider the case where ω ∈
(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(Q) ,∞
)
.
Based on our analysis in Appendix F, when u (z) = ln (1 + z)
and θ ∼ U [0, θmax], we have the following results:
Nad (ω) =
θmax − θ2
θmax
N,E [y] =
θ2 − θ1 + θmax − θ1
2Φ
,
(84)
E
[
y2
]
=
(
θ2 − θ1 + θmax − θ1
2Φ
)2
+
(
θmax−θ1−(θ2−θ1)
Φ
)2
12
.
(85)
To simplify the presentation, we let yh , θmax−θ1Φ
and yl , θ2−θ1Φ . Based on the relation y3h − y3l =(
y2l + y
2
h + ylyh
)
(yh − yl), we can derive the following equa-
tion:
(E [y])2
E [y2]
Nad (ω) =
3
4
NΦ
θmax
(
y2h − y2l
)2
y3h − y3l
. (86)
We can compute the derivative of (
y2h−y2l )
2
y3h−y3l
with respect to
ω as follows:
d
(
(y2h−y2l )
2
y3h−y3l
)
dω
=
−dθ2dω 1Φ
(
yhy
2
l + 4y
2
hyl + y
3
l
)
+ θ1ωΦ (yh − yl)3
(y2h + y
2
l + yhyl)
2 .
(87)
From our analysis in Appendix D, we have dθ2dω < 0. Moreover,
we have yh > yl. We can see that the above derivative is
positive. Therefore, (E[y])
2
E[y2] N
ad (ω) increases with ω.
Then, we can compute E [y]Nad (ω) as follows:
E [y]Nad (ω) =
θ2 − θ1 + θmax − θ1
2Φ
θmax − θ2
θmax
N. (88)
The derivative with respect to ω is computed as
d
(
E [y]Nad (ω)
)
dω
=
N
2Φθmax
(
dθ2
dω
θmax − 2dθ1
dω
θmax − dθ2
dω
θ2 + 2
dθ1
dω
θ2
)
+
N
2Φθmax
(
−dθ2
dω
θ2 − dθ2
dω
θmax + 2
dθ2
dω
θ1
)
=
N
2Φθmax
(
2 (θ2 − θmax) dθ1
dω
+ 2 (θ1 − θ2) dθ2
dω
)
. (89)
Since θmax > θ2 > θ1, dθ1dω < 0, and
dθ2
dω < 0, we can see that
E [y]Nad (ω) increases with ω.
Combing Step 1 and Step 2, we can see that when
u (z) = ln (1 + z) and θ ∼ U [0, θmax], both (E[y])
2
E[y2] N
ad (ω)
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Fig. 8: Impact of ω on E [y]Nad (ω).
and E [y]Nad (ω) increase with ω for ω ∈
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
,∞
)
.
According to Theorem 2, the optimal unit data reward is given
by ω∗ = D−1 (C).
APPENDIX K
EXAMPLE WHERE E [y]Nad (ω) DECREASES WITH ω
We use a numerical example to show that when each
user has an exponential utility function, it is possible that
E [y]Nad (ω) (i.e., the number of available ad slots) decreases
with ω and ω∗ < D−1 (C).
We assume that u (z) = 1−e−γz , and obtain the distribution
of θ by truncating the normal distribution N (30, 60) to inter-
val [0, 320]. We choose γ = 0.95, N = 107, F = 40, Q = 2,
Φ = 0.5, K = 16, A = 0.9, B = 5, and C = 2.15× 107.
In Fig. 8, we plot the value of E [y]Nad (ω) against ω (under
the SAR scheme). We can see that E [y]Nad (ω) is decreasing
in ω ∈ [0.117, 0.217]. Moreover, we can numerically compute
that ω∗ = 0.137 and D (ω∗) = 1.846× 107. Since D (ω∗) is
smaller than C and D (ω) increases with ω under the SAR
scheme, we can see that ω∗ < D−1 (C).
APPENDIX L
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof. Let v (θ) = θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)) − Φω (u′)−1 ( Φωθ ) −
θu (Q) + F . First, since u′
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))
= Φωθ , we can
compute dv(θ)dθ as
dv (θ)
dθ
= u
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))
− u (Q) . (90)
Recall that u (·) is increasing and (u′)−1 (·) is decreasing.
When θ = θ1 = Φωu′(Q) , we have
dv(θ)
dθ = 0; when θ < θ1, we
can see that dv(θ)dθ <
dv(θ)
dθ |θ=θ1 = 0.
Second, since θ3 = Φωu′(0) , we can compute v (θ3) as
follows:
v (θ3) = − Φ
ωu′ (0)
u (Q) + F. (91)
When ω > Φu(Q)Fu′(0) , we can see that v (θ3) > 0.
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Third, we compute v (θ1) as follows:
v (θ1) = −Φ
ω
Q+ F. (92)
When ω < ΦQF , we can see that v (θ1) < 0.
Hence, when ω ∈
(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(0) ,
ΦQ
F
)
, we have dv(θ)dθ < 0 for
θ < θ1, v (θ3) > 0, and v (θ1) < 0. Moreover, we have
dv(θ)
dθ |θ=θ1 = 0. We can conclude that there exists a unique
θ4 ∈ (θ3, θ1) satisfying v (θ4) = 0.
APPENDIX M
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Proof. Step 1: We analyze Case Aˆ, i.e., ω ∈
[
0, Φu′(Q)θmax
]
.
Suppose a type-θ user subscribes to the data plan, i.e., r = 1.
Its payoff is Πuser (θ, 1, x, ω) = θu (Q+ ωx)− F − Φx. We
can see that
∂Πuser (θ, 1, x, ω)
∂x
= θωu′ (Q+ ωx)− Φ
≤ u
′ (Q+ ωx) θ
u′ (Q) θmax
Φ− Φ. (93)
Since u′ (·) is a strictly decreasing function, we have
u′ (Q+ ωx) < u′ (Q) for x > 0. Hence, ∂Π
user(θ,1,x,ω)
∂x < 0
for x > 0. This implies that if a user subscribes to the data
plan, it will not watch any ad for rewards. In this case, the
user’s payoff is θu (Q)− F .
Suppose a type-θ user does not subscribe, i.e., r = 0. Its
payoff is Πuser (θ, 0, x, ω) = θu (ωx)− Φx. We can see that
∂Πuser (θ, 0, x, ω)
∂x
= ωθu′ (ωx)− Φ.
Hence, if θ ∈
[
Φ
ωu′(0) , θmax
]
, the user will watch ads with
x = 1ω (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
, and its payoff will be θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))−
Φ
ω (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
; otherwise, the user will not watch ads, and its
payoff will be zero.
Next, we compare the choices of r = 1 and r = 0. Recall
that we assume θmax >
u′(0)F
u′(Q)u(Q) in Section II-D. Hence,
when ω ≤ Φu′(Q)θmax , we have
Φ
ωu′ (0)
≥ u
′ (Q) θmax
u′ (0)
>
F
u (Q)
. (94)
Consider a user with θ ∈
[
0, Fu(Q)
)
. As we discussed above,
if it subscribes, it will not watch ads and its payoff will be
θu (Q)−F . Since θ < Fu(Q) , this payoff is negative. If it does
not subscribe, since θ < Fu(Q) <
Φ
ωu′(0) , it will not watch ads
and its payoff will be zero. Comparing r = 0 and r = 1, this
user will not subscribe or watch ads, i.e., rˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 0 and
xˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 0.
Consider a user with θ ∈
[
F
u(Q) ,
Φ
ωu′(0)
)
. As we discussed
above, if it subscribes, it will not watch ads and its payoff will
be θu (Q)−F . Since θ ≥ Fu(Q) , this payoff is non-negative. If
it does not subscribe, since θ < Φωu′(0) , it will not watch ads
and its payoff will be zero. Comparing r = 0 and r = 1, this
user will subscribe without watching any ad, i.e., rˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 1
and xˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 0.
Consider a user with θ ∈
[
Φ
ωu′(0) , θmax
]
. As we discussed
above, if it subscribes, it will not watch ads and its payoff will
be θu (Q)−F . If it does not subscribe, it will watch ads and
its payoff will be θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)) − Φω (u′)−1 ( Φωθ ). Next,
we compare these two payoffs. We define
s (θ) , θu (Q)− F − θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))
+
Φ
ω
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
.
(95)
From u′
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))
= Φωθ , we can compute the derivative
of s (θ) as follows:
ds (θ)
dθ
= u (Q)− u
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))
. (96)
Since (u′)−1 (·) is decreasing and ω ≤ Φu′(Q)θmax ≤ Φu′(Q)θ ,
we can see that ds(θ)dθ ≥ 0. Moreover, we can compute
s
(
Φ
ωu′(0)
)
as follows:
s
(
Φ
ωu′ (0)
)
=
Φ
ωu′ (0)
u (Q)− F. (97)
When ω ≤ Φu′(Q)θmax , the value of s
(
Φ
ωu′(0)
)
is no less than
u′(Q)θmax
u′(0) u (Q)− F . Based on θmax > u
′(0)F
u′(Q)u(Q) , we further
have the relation that s
(
Φ
ωu′(0)
)
> u
′(Q)
u′(0) u (Q)
u′(0)F
u′(Q)u(Q) −
F = 0. From ds(θ)dθ ≥ 0 and s
(
Φ
ωu′(0)
)
> 0, we can see that
when θ ≥ Φωu′(0) , the value of s (θ) is positive. This implies
that the user should subscribe as it achieves a higher payoff.
Hence, we have rˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 1 and xˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 0.
Combining the above three regions of θ, we can conclude
that (note that θ0 = Fu(Q) )
rˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 1{θ≥θ0}, xˆ
∗ (θ, ω) = 0, θ ∈ [0, θmax] . (98)
Step 2: We analyze Case Bˆ, i.e., ω ∈
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
, Φu(Q)Fu′(0)
]
.
Suppose a type-θ user subscribes to the data plan, i.e., r = 1.
Its payoff is Πuser (θ, 1, x, ω) = θu (Q+ ωx)− F − Φx. We
can see that
∂Πuser (θ, 1, x, ω)
∂x
= θωu′ (Q+ ωx)− Φ. (99)
(i) If θ ∈
[
0, Φωu′(Q)
)
, the user will not watch ads (i.e.,
x = 0), and its payoff will be θu (Q)− F ;
(ii) If θ ∈
[
Φ
ωu′(Q) , θmax
]
, the user will choose x =
1
ω (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
) − Qω ≥ 0. Then, we can see that the user’s
payoff is
Πuser
(
θ, 1,
1
ω
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
− Q
ω
,ω
)
=
θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))
− F − Φ
(
1
ω
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
− Q
ω
)
.
(100)
Suppose a type-θ user does not subscribe, i.e., r = 0. Its
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payoff is Πuser (θ, 0, x, ω) = θu (ωx)− Φx. We can see that
∂Πuser (θ, 0, x, ω)
∂x
= ωθu′ (ωx)− Φ.
Hence, if θ ∈
[
Φ
ωu′(0) , θmax
]
, the user will watch ads with
x = 1ω (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
, and its payoff will be θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))−
Φ
ω (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
; otherwise, the user will not watch ads, and its
payoff will be zero.
Next, we compare the choices of r = 1 and r = 0.
From the concavity of u (·) and limz→∞ u′ (z) = 0, we have
u′ (0) > u′ (Q) > 0. Hence, when ω ≤ Φu(Q)Fu′(0) , we have
F
u(Q) ≤ Φωu′(0) < Φωu′(Q) .
Consider a user with θ ∈
[
0, Fu(Q)
)
. If this user chooses r =
1, it will not watch ads and its payoff will be θu (Q)−F , which
is negative. If this user chooses r = 0, it will not watch ads
and its payoff will be zero. Hence, the user will not subscribe
or watch ads, i.e., rˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 0 and xˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 0.
Consider a user with θ ∈
[
F
u(Q) ,
Φ
ωu′(0)
)
. If this user
chooses r = 1, it will not watch ads and its payoff will be
θu (Q)−F , which is non-negative. If this user chooses r = 0,
it will not watch ads and its payoff will be zero. Hence, the
user will subscribe without watching ads, i.e., rˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 1
and xˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 0.
Consider a user with θ ∈
[
Φ
ωu′(0) ,
Φ
ωu′(Q)
)
. If this user
chooses r = 1, it will not watch ads and its payoff will be
θu (Q)−F , which is non-negative. If this user chooses r = 0,
it will watch ads and its payoff will be θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)) −
Φ
ω (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
. Next we compare these two payoffs. We can
see that the difference between these two payoffs is captured
by s (θ) defined in (95). Based on our analysis in Step 1,
we can see that when θ < Φωu′(Q) , we have
ds(θ)
dθ > 0 and
s
(
Φ
ωu′(0)
)
= Φωu′(0)u (Q) − F . Because ω ≤ Φu(Q)Fu′(0) in Case
Bˆ, we can see that s
(
Φ
ωu′(0)
)
≥ 0. Therefore, s (θ) is non-
negative for θ ∈
[
Φ
ωu′(0) ,
Φ
ωu′(Q)
)
. This implies that the user
should subscribe without watching ads, i.e., rˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 1 and
xˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 0.
Consider a user with θ ∈
[
Φ
ωu′(Q) , θmax
]
. If this user
chooses r = 1, it will watch ads and its payoff will be
θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))−F −Φ( 1ω (u′)−1 ( Φωθ )− Qω ). If this user
chooses r = 0, it will watch ads and its payoff will be
θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)) − Φω (u′)−1 ( Φωθ ). Next we compare this
two payoffs. We can see that the difference between these
two payoffs is −F + ΦQω . We first analyze the value of
u (Q)−u′ (0)Q. We can easily see that the following equation
holds:
u (Q)− u′ (0)Q = u (0) +
∫ Q
0
u′ (q) dq −
∫ Q
0
u′ (0) dq.
(101)
From u (0) = 0 and the strict concavity of u (·), we have
u (Q)− u′ (0)Q < 0. Then, since ω ≤ Φu(Q)Fu′(0) in Case Bˆ, we
have ω < ΦQF . Recall that the difference in the two payoffs is
ΦQ
ω − F . We can see that the user can get a higher payoff
by subscription and watching ads, i.e., rˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 1 and
xˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 1ω (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)− Qω .
Combining the above four regions of θ, we can conclude
that the following result holds for θ ∈ [0, θmax] (recall that
θ0 =
F
u(Q) and θ1 =
Φ
ωu′(Q) ):
rˆ∗(θ, ω)=1{θ≥θ0},xˆ
∗(θ, ω)=
1
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
1{θ≥θ1}.
(102)
Step 3: We analyze Case Cˆ, i.e., ω ∈
(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(0) ,
ΦQ
F
)
.
Suppose a type-θ user subscribes to the data plan, i.e., r = 1.
Based on our prior analysis in Step 2, we have the following
results:
(i) If θ ∈
[
0, Φωu′(Q)
)
, the user will not watch ads (i.e.,
x = 0), and its payoff will be θu (Q)− F ;
(ii) If θ ∈
[
Φ
ωu′(Q) , θmax
]
, the user will choose x =
1
ω (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)−Qω , and its payoff will be θu((u′)−1 ( Φωθ ))−
F − Φ
(
1
ω (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)− Qω ).
Suppose a type-θ user does not subscribe, i.e., r = 0. Based
on our prior analysis in Step 2, we have the following results:
(i) If θ ∈
[
0, Φωu′(0)
)
, the user will not watch ads, and its
payoff will be zero.
(ii) If θ ∈
[
Φ
ωu′(0) , θmax
]
, the user will watch ads with
x = 1ω (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
, and its payoff will be θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))−
Φ
ω (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
.
Next, we compare the choices of r = 1 and r = 0. Since
ω > Φu(Q)Fu′(0) , we have
Φ
ωu′(0) <
F
u(Q) . Based on our analysis
in Appendix L, when ω ∈
(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(0) ,
ΦQ
F
)
, there is a unique
θ4 ∈
(
Φ
ωu′(0) ,
Φ
ωu′(Q)
)
satisfying θ4u
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ4
))
−
Φ
ω (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ4
)
− θ4u (Q) + F = 0.
Consider a user with θ ∈
[
0, Φωu′(0)
)
. If this user chooses
r = 1, it will not watch ads and its payoff will be θu (Q)−F ,
which is negative due to θ < Φωu′(0) <
F
u(Q) . If this user
chooses r = 0, it will not watch ads and its payoff will be
zero. Hence, the user will not subscribe or watch ads, i.e.,
rˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 0 and xˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 0.
Consider a user with θ ∈
[
Φ
ωu′(0) , θ4
)
. If this user chooses
r = 1, it will not watch ads (due to θ4 < Φωu′(Q) ) and its payoff
will be θu (Q)− F . If this user chooses r = 0, it will watch
ads and its payoff will be θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))− Φω (u′)−1 ( Φωθ ).
Next, we compare these two payoffs. In Appendix L, we
have proved that function v (θ) = θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)) −
Φ
ω (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
) − θu (Q) + F is decreasing for θ < Φωu′(Q)
and its value is zero when θ = θ4. Therefore, when
θ < θ4, we have v (θ) > 0. After rearrangement, we have
θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)) − Φω (u′)−1 ( Φωθ ) > θu (Q) − F . This
implies that the user will not subscribe but it will watch ads,
i.e., rˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 0 and xˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 1ω (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
.
Consider a user with θ ∈
[
θ4,
Φ
ωu′(Q)
)
. Compared with
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the user with θ ∈
[
Φ
ωu′(Q) , θ4
)
, the only difference here is
the comparison between θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)) − Φω (u′)−1 ( Φωθ )
and θu (Q)− F . Based on our analysis of v (θ) in Appendix
L, we can see that v (θ) ≤ 0 for θ ≥ θ4. Hence, we
have θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))− Φω (u′)−1 ( Φωθ ) ≤ θu (Q)− F . This
implies that the user will subscribe without watching ads, i.e.,
rˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 1 and xˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 0.
Consider a user with θ ∈
[
Φ
ωu′(Q) , θmax
]
. If this user
chooses r = 1, it will watch ads and its payoff will be
θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))−F −Φ( 1ω (u′)−1 ( Φωθ )− Qω ). If this user
chooses r = 0, it will watch ads and its payoff will be
θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)) − Φω (u′)−1 ( Φωθ ). When ω < ΦQF , the
former payoff is greater. That is to say, the user should
subscribe and watch ads, i.e., rˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 1 and xˆ∗ (θ, ω) =
1
ω (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)− Qω .
Combining the above four regions of θ, we can conclude
the following result. For θ ∈ [0, θmax], we have (recall that
θ3 =
Φ
ωu′(0) and θ1 =
Φ
ωu′(Q) )
rˆ∗(θ,ω)=1{θ≥θ4}, (103)
xˆ∗(θ,ω)=
1
ω
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
1{θ3≤θ<θ4}+
1
ω
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
1{θ≥θ1}.
Step 4: We analyze Case Dˆ, i.e., ω ≥ ΦQF .
Note that the cost of getting a unit data by subscription is
F
Q , and the “cost” of getting a unit data by watching ads is
Φ
ω
(i.e., the disutility of watching one ad over the corresponding
data reward). When ω ≥ ΦQF , we have FQ ≥ Φω . This implies
that a user should never consider the subscription, since the
user can always watch ads to win the same amount of data
but incur a total cost that is no greater than that under the
subscription. Hence, we have rˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 0 for θ ∈ [0, θmax].
Now we can write a type-θ user’s payoff as
Πuser (θ, 0, x, ω) = θu (ωx)− Φx. We can see that
∂Πuser (θ, 0, x, ω)
∂x
= θωu′ (ωx)− Φ.
Hence, if θ ∈
[
0, Φωu′(0)
)
, the user will not watch ads;
otherwise, it will watch ads with x = 1ω (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
. That is
to say, we have the following result for θ ∈ [0, θmax] (recall
that θ3 = Φωu′(0) ):
rˆ∗ (θ, ω) = 0, xˆ∗ (θ, ω) =
1
ω
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
1{θ≥θ3}. (104)
Hence, we have proved rˆ∗ (θ, ω) and xˆ∗ (θ, ω) for Case Aˆ,
Case Bˆ, Case Cˆ, and Case Dˆ.
APPENDIX N
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof. Step 1: We first prove that when ω ∈
(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(0) ,
ΦQ
F
)
,
the relation that θ4 > θ0 holds.
Based on our analysis in Appendix L, if we let v (θ) =
θu
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
))− Φω (u′)−1 ( Φωθ )− θu (Q) + F , then v (θ)
is decreasing when θ < θ1 = Φωu′(Q) . Moreover, θ4 satisfies
θ3 < θ4 < θ1 and v (θ4) = 0.
Now we check the value of v (θ0). We can see that
v (θ0)=
F
u (Q)
u
(
(u′)−1
(
Φu (Q)
ωF
))
−Φ
ω
(u′)−1
(
Φu (Q)
ωF
)
.
(105)
Let ρ (ω) , Fu(Q)u
(
(u′)−1
(
Φu(Q)
ωF
))
−Φω (u′)−1
(
Φu(Q)
ωF
)
.
From u′
(
(u′)−1
(
Φu(Q)
ωF
))
= Φu(Q)ωF , we can compute
dρ(ω)
dω
as
dρ (ω)
dω
=
Φ
ω2
(u′)−1
(
Φu (Q)
ωF
)
. (106)
When ω = Φu(Q)Fu′(0) , the value of (u
′)−1
(
Φu(Q)
ωF
)
is zero. When
ω > Φu(Q)Fu′(0) , the value of (u
′)−1
(
Φu(Q)
ωF
)
is greater than zero.
Therefore, when ω = Φu(Q)Fu′(0) , we have
dρ(ω)
dω = 0; when
ω > Φu(Q)Fu′(0) , we have
dρ(ω)
dω > 0. Moreover, by substituting
ω = Φu(Q)Fu′(0) into the expression of ρ (ω), we can see that
ρ
(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(0)
)
= 0. Then, we can conclude that when ω > Φu(Q)Fu′(0) ,
we have ρ (ω) > 0. Because ρ (ω) has the same expression as
v (θ0). When ω >
Φu(Q)
Fu′(0) , the value of v (θ0) is positive.
Next, we compare θ0 = Fu(Q) with θ1 =
Φ
ωu′(Q) . We can
compute θ0θ1 as
θ0
θ1
= Fωu
′(Q)
u(Q)Φ . When ω <
ΦQ
F , we have
θ0
θ1
<
Qu′(Q)
u(Q) . We can rewrite
Qu′(Q)
u(Q) as follows:
Qu′ (Q)
u (Q)
=
∫ Q
0
u′ (Q) dq
u (0) +
∫ Q
0
u′ (q) dq
. (107)
From u (0) = 0 and the strict concavity of u (·), we have
Qu′(Q)
u(Q) < 1. The value of
θ0
θ1
is less than 1, i.e., θ0 is smaller
than θ1.
So far, we have shown the following results. First, both θ0
and θ4 are smaller than θ1. Second, v (θ) is decreasing for
θ < θ1. Third, v (θ0) > 0 and v (θ4) = 0. It is easy to see that
θ0 < θ4.
Step 2: We prove that in Case Cˆ, θ4 increases as ω
increases.
Based on θ4’s definition, we have
θ4u
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ4
))
− Φ
ω
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ4
)
− θ4u (Q) + F = 0.
(108)
For both sides of the equation, we take their derivatives with
respect to ω. Since u′
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ4
))
= Φωθ4 , we can get
dθ4
dω
u
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ4
))
+
Φ
ω2
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ4
)
− dθ4
dω
u (Q) = 0.
(109)
After rearrangement, we can see that
dθ4
dω
=
Φ
ω2 (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ4
)
u (Q)− u
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ4
)) . (110)
Since θ4 > θ3 = Φωu′(0) , we have (u
′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ4
)
> 0. More-
over, since θ4 < θ1 = Φωu′(Q) , we have u
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ4
))
<
24
u (Q). Hence, dθ4dω > 0.
APPENDIX O
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof. Step 1: We prove that when C > N (u′)−1
(
F
θmaxQ
)
,
we have Dˆ (ω) < C for all ω ∈
[
0, ΦQF
)
.
First, since (u′)−1 (·) is a decreasing function and θmax >
u′(0)F
u′(Q)u(Q) (our assumption in Section II-D), we can derive the
following inequality:
N (u′)−1
(
F
θmaxQ
)
> N (u′)−1
(
u′ (Q)u (Q)
u′ (0)Q
)
. (111)
Then, we analyze the value of u(Q)u′(0)Q . The fraction can be
rewritten as follows:
u (Q)
u′ (0)Q
=
u (0) +
∫ Q
0
u′ (q) dq∫ Q
0
u′ (0) dq
. (112)
Since u (0) = 0 and u (·) is a strict increasing and concave
function, we can see that u(Q)u′(0)Q < 1. Based on this inequality
and (111), we have the following result:
N (u′)−1
(
F
θmaxQ
)
> N (u′)−1 (u′ (Q)) = NQ. (113)
Therefore, when C > N (u′)−1
(
F
θmaxQ
)
, we also have C >
NQ.
Next, we analyze the values of Dˆ (ω) in Case Aˆ, Case Bˆ,
and Case Cˆ. When ω ∈
[
0, Φu′(Q)θmax
]
, we can compute Dˆ (ω)
as follows:
Dˆ (ω) = NQ
∫ θmax
θ0
g (θ) dθ. (114)
Since
∫ θmax
θ0
g (θ) dθ < 1 and C > NQ, the value of Dˆ (ω) is
smaller than C when ω ∈
[
0, Φu′(Q)θmax
]
.
When ω ∈
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
, Φu(Q)Fu′(0)
]
, we can compute Dˆ (ω) as
follows:
Dˆ (ω) = NQ
∫ θmax
θ0
g (θ) dθ
+N
∫ θmax
θ1
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
g (θ) dθ
= NQ
∫ θ1
θ0
g (θ) dθ +N
∫ θmax
θ1
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
g (θ) dθ.
(115)
As proved above, we have u(Q)u′(0)Q < 1. Since ω ≤ Φu(Q)Fu′(0) ,
we can see that ω < ΦQF . Moreover, (u
′)−1 (·) is decreasing
and θ ≤ θmax. We can get the relation that (u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
<
(u′)−1
(
F
Qθmax
)
. Based on this relation and (115), we can
derive the following inequality:
Dˆ (ω)<NQ
∫ θ1
θ0
g (θ) dθ+N (u′)−1
(
F
Qθmax
)∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ) dθ
(a)
< N (u′)−1
(
F
Qθmax
)(∫ θ1
θ0
g (θ) dθ +
∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ) dθ
)
< N (u′)−1
(
F
Qθmax
)
< C. (116)
Here, inequality (a) is due to (113). Hence, we have shown
that the value of Dˆ (ω) is smaller than C when ω ∈(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
, Φu(Q)Fu′(0)
]
.
When ω ∈
(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(0) ,
ΦQ
F
)
, we can compute Dˆ (ω) as
follows:
Dˆ (ω) =NQ
∫ θmax
θ4
g (θ) dθ +N
∫ θ4
θ3
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
g (θ) dθ
+N
∫ θmax
θ1
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
g (θ) dθ
=NQ
∫ θ1
θ4
g (θ) dθ +N
∫ θ4
θ3
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
g (θ) dθ
+N
∫ θmax
θ1
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
g (θ) dθ. (117)
Based on a similar discussion as that after (115), we can
prove that (u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
< (u′)−1
(
F
Qθmax
)
. Then, we have
the following result:
Dˆ (ω) < NQ
∫ θ1
θ4
g (θ) dθ
+N (u′)−1
(
F
Qθmax
)(∫ θ4
θ3
g (θ) dθ+
∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ) dθ
)
.
(118)
From this inequality, (113), and C > N (u′)−1
(
F
θmaxQ
)
, we
can see that the value of Dˆ (ω) is smaller than C.
Combing our analysis for the cases where ω ∈[
0, Φu′(Q)θmax
]
, ω ∈
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
, Φu(Q)Fu′(0)
]
, and ω ∈(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(0) ,
ΦQ
F
)
, we can conclude that Dˆ (ω) < C for all
ω ∈
[
0, ΦQF
)
.
Step 2: We prove that when A > B
2K
8F
∫ θmax
θ0
g(θ)dθ
, the value
of ωˆ∗ lies in interval
[
0, ΦQF
)
.
When ω ∈
[
ΦQ
F ,∞
)
, all users watch ads without subscrip-
tion. In this case, the operator’s revenue only consists of the ad
revenue. We can compute the operator’s revenue as follows:
Rˆtotal (ω, pˆ∗ (ω)) = Rˆad (ω, pˆ∗ (ω))
= Kmˆ∗ (ω, pˆ∗ (ω)) pˆ∗ (ω)
= K
(E [yˆ])2
E [yˆ2]
Nˆad (ω)
B − pˆ∗ (ω)
2A
pˆ∗ (ω) .
(119)
Note that (E[yˆ])
2
E[yˆ2] =
(E[yˆ])2
(E[yˆ])2+Var[yˆ] ≤ 1, where Var [yˆ] is the
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variance of yˆ. Moreover, since B−pˆ
∗(ω)
2A pˆ
∗ (ω) is quadratic in
pˆ∗ (ω), we have the following relation:
B − pˆ∗ (ω)
2A
pˆ∗ (ω) ≤ B
2
8A
. (120)
Based on the above inequality, (E[yˆ])
2
E[yˆ2] ≤ 1, and Nˆad (ω) ≤ N ,
we can derive the following inequality:
Rˆtotal (ω, pˆ∗ (ω)) ≤ B
2K
8A
N. (121)
Hence, when ω ∈
[
ΦQ
F ,∞
)
, the value of Rˆtotal (ω, pˆ∗ (ω)) is
upper bounded by B
2K
8A N .
Next, we analyze the lower bound of Rˆtotal (ω, pˆ∗ (ω))
when ω ∈
(
Φ
u′(Q)θmax
, Φu(Q)Fu′(0)
]
. In this case, the operator’s
ad revenue (i.e., Rˆad (ω, pˆ∗ (ω))) and the revenue from the
data market (i.e., Rˆdata (ω)) are positive. We can derive the
following relation:
Rˆtotal (ω, pˆ∗ (ω)) > Rˆdata (ω) = NF
∫ θmax
θ0
g (θ) dθ. (122)
If A > B
2K
8F
∫ θmax
θ0
g(θ)dθ
, the right side of (122) is greater than
the right side of (121). This implies that the optimal unit
reward ωˆ∗ /∈
[
ΦQ
F ,∞
)
. In other words, the value of ωˆ∗ lies
in interval
[
0, ΦQF
)
.
Combining Step 1 and Step 2, we can conclude that
Dˆ (ωˆ∗) < C.
APPENDIX P
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof. Recall that ΠSURD is the optimal objective value of
problem (20)-(23), and ΠSUR is the optimal objective value
of problem (18)-(19). Suppose that (ω, p) is a feasible solution
to (18)-(19). To prove that ΠSURD ≥ ΠSUR, we can simply
show that for any (ω, p), we are able to find a corresponding
(ω, pI, pII) such that (i) (ω, pI, pII) is feasible to problem (20)-
(23) and (ii) the value of objective (20) under (ω, pI, pII)
equals the value of (18) under (ω, p).
Note that when ω satisfies Case Aˆ, Case Bˆ, or Case Dˆ,
the subscribers and non-subscribers will not simultaneously
choose to watch ads. In this situation, the operator cannot
differentiate ad slots based on the subscription decisions of
the users watching ads. As we mentioned in Section IV-D,
problem (18)-(19) and problem (20)-(23) are the same. For
example, when ω satisfies Case Bˆ, only the subscribers watch
ads. Then, both NˆadII (ω) and mˆ
∗
II (ω, pII) are zeros. This
allows us to remove the term Kmˆ∗II (ω, pII) pII in objective
(20) and also ignore constraint (23). We can see that problem
(20)-(23) reduces to problem (18)-(19).
Next, we focus on the situations where ω satisfies Case Cˆ.
There are two possible situations.
If (ω, p) is a feasible solution to problem (18)-(19) and
p ≥ B, we can see that mˆ∗ (ω, p) = 0 and Rˆad (ω, p) = 0,
which implies that the operator’s total revenue only consists
of the revenue from the data market. Then, we can construct
a solution (ω, pI, pII) where pI, pII ≥ B. Under pI and pII,
we have mˆ∗I (ω, pI) = mˆ
∗
II (ω, pII) = 0. We can easily verify
that (i) the solution (ω, pI, pII) is feasible to problem (20)-(23)
and (ii) the value of objective (20) under (ω, pI, pII) equals the
value of (18) under (ω, p) (i.e., both values equal Rˆdata (ω)).
If (ω, p) is a feasible solution to problem (18)-(19) and
p < B, we can construct a solution (ω, pI, pII) where pI and
pII are given by
pI = B − (B − p) E [yˆ]E [yˆ2]
E
[
yˆ2I
]
E [yˆI]
, (123)
pII = B − (B − p) E [yˆ]E [yˆ2]
E
[
yˆ2II
]
E [yˆII]
. (124)
Step 1: We can prove that this solution is feasible to
problem (20)-(23). Specifically, since p < B, we can see
that pI, pII < B. Moreover, since ω satisfies Case Cˆ, we
have NˆadI (ω) , Nˆ
ad
II (ω) > 0. Based on our discussions about
mˆ∗I (ω, pI) and mˆ
∗
II (ω, pII) in Section IV-D, we have the
following relations:
mˆ∗I (ω, pI) =
max {B − pI, 0}
2A
(E [yˆI])2
E [yˆ2I ]
NˆadI (ω)
=
B − p
2A
E [yˆ]
E [yˆ2]
E
[
yˆ2I
]
E [yˆI]
(E [yˆI])2
E [yˆ2I ]
NˆadI (ω)
=
B − p
2A
E [yˆ]E [yˆI]
E [yˆ2]
NˆadI (ω) , (126)
mˆ∗II (ω, pII) =
B − p
2A
E [yˆ]E [yˆII]
E [yˆ2]
NˆadII (ω) . (127)
Then, we can verify the feasibility of constraints (22) and (23).
By substituting the expression of mˆ∗I (ω, pI) in (126), we can
compute the ratio between Kmˆ∗I (ω, pI) and E [yˆI] NˆadI (ω) as
follows:
Kmˆ∗I (ω, pI)
E [yˆI] NˆadI (ω)
= K
B − p
2A
E [yˆ]
E [yˆ2]
. (128)
Because (ω, p) is a feasible solution to problem (18)-(19)
and p < B, we have the relation that Kmˆ
∗(ω,p)
Nˆad(ω)E[yˆ] ≤ 1.
Since mˆ∗ (ω, p) = B−p2A
(E[yˆ])2
E[yˆ2] Nˆ
ad (ω), we can see that
K B−p2A
E[yˆ]
E[yˆ2] ≤ 1. This means the left side of (128) is no
greater than 1. Therefore, Kmˆ
∗
I (ω,pI)
E[yˆI]NˆadI (ω)
is no greater than 1,
which implies the feasibility of constraint (22).
Based on a similar approach, we can prove that ω and pII
given in (124) satisfy constraint (23). Because constraint (21)
(i.e., Dˆ (ω) ≤ C) is the same as the capacity constraint in
problem (18)-(19) and (ω, p) is feasible to problem (18)-(19),
we can see that the solution (ω, pI, pII) satisfies constraint
(21). Therefore, we can conclude that the solution (ω, pI, pII)
is feasible to problem (20)-(23).
Step 2: We prove that the value of objective (20) under
(ω, pI, pII) equals the value of objective (18) under (ω, p).
Since both objectives include Rˆdata (ω) (i.e., the revenue
from the data market) and the values of Rˆdata (ω) are the
same, we only need to compare the remaining terms (i.e.,
the ad revenues) in these two objectives. Next, we prove that
Kmˆ∗I (ω, pI) pI +Kmˆ
∗
II (ω, pII) pII equals Kmˆ
∗ (ω, p) p.
According to (126) and (127), we have the following
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NˆadI (ω)E [yˆI] pI + NˆadII (ω)E [yˆII] pII
=NˆadI (ω)E [yˆI]
(
B − (B − p) E [yˆ]
E [yˆ2]
E
[
yˆ2I
]
E [yˆI]
)
+ NˆadII (ω)E [yˆII]
(
B − (B − p) E [yˆ]
E [yˆ2]
E
[
yˆ2II
]
E [yˆII]
)
=B
(
NˆadI (ω)E [yˆI] + NˆadII (ω)E [yˆII]
)
− (B − p) E [yˆ]
E [yˆ2]
(
NˆadI (ω)E
[
yˆ2I
]
+ NˆadII (ω)E
[
yˆ2II
])
(a)
=B
(
Nˆad (ω)
∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ)dθ∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ)dθ +
∫ θ4
θ3
g (θ)dθ
∫ θmax
θ1
xˆ∗ (θ, ω)
g (θ)∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ)dθ
dθ+
Nˆad (ω)
∫ θ4
θ3
g (θ)dθ∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ)dθ +
∫ θ4
θ3
g (θ)dθ
∫ θ4
θ3
xˆ∗ (θ, ω)
g (θ)∫ θ4
θ3
g (θ)dθ
dθ
)
− (B−p) E [yˆ]
E [yˆ2]
(
Nˆad (ω)
∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ)dθ∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ)dθ +
∫ θ4
θ3
g (θ)dθ
∫ θmax
θ1
(xˆ∗ (θ, ω))2 g (θ)∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ)dθ
dθ+
Nˆad (ω)
∫ θ4
θ3
g (θ)dθ∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ)dθ +
∫ θ4
θ3
g (θ)dθ
∫ θ4
θ3
(xˆ∗ (θ, ω))2 g (θ)∫ θ4
θ3
g (θ)dθ
dθ
)
=B
Nˆad (ω)∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ) dθ +
∫ θ4
θ3
g (θ) dθ
(∫ θmax
θ1
xˆ∗ (θ, ω) g (θ) dθ +
∫ θ4
θ3
xˆ∗ (θ, ω) g (θ)dθ
)
− (B − p) E [yˆ]
E [yˆ2]
Nˆad (ω)∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ) dθ +
∫ θ4
θ3
g (θ) dθ
(∫ θmax
θ1
(xˆ∗ (θ, ω))2 g (θ) dθ +
∫ θ4
θ3
(xˆ∗ (θ, ω))2 g (θ)dθ
)
(b)
=BNˆad (ω)E [yˆ]− (B − p) E [yˆ]
E [yˆ2]
Nˆad (ω)E
[
yˆ2
]
=BNˆad (ω)E [yˆ]− (B − p) Nˆad (ω)E [yˆ] = pNˆad (ω)E [yˆ] . (125)
relation:
Kmˆ∗I (ω, pI) pI +Kmˆ
∗
II (ω, pII) pII
=K
B − p
2A
E [yˆ]
E [yˆ2]
(
NˆadI (ω)E [yˆI] pI + NˆadII (ω)E [yˆII] pII
)
.
(129)
Then, we substitute the expressions of pI and pII in (123) and
(124) and compute NˆadI (ω)E [yˆI] pI + NˆadII (ω)E [yˆII] pII in
(125). Note that in step (a) and step (b) of (125), we have
expanded the expressions of some terms as follows:
NˆadI (ω) =
Nˆad (ω)
∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ) dθ∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ) dθ +
∫ θ4
θ3
g (θ) dθ
, (130)
NˆadII (ω) =
Nˆad (ω)
∫ θ4
θ3
g (θ) dθ∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ) dθ +
∫ θ4
θ3
g (θ) dθ
, (131)
E [yˆI] =
∫ θmax
θ1
xˆ∗ (θ, ω)
g (θ)∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ) dθ
dθ, (132)
E [yˆII] =
∫ θ4
θ3
xˆ∗ (θ, ω)
g (θ)∫ θ4
θ3
g (θ) dθ
dθ, (133)
E [yˆ] =
∫ θmax
θ1
xˆ∗ (θ, ω) g (θ) dθ +
∫ θ4
θ3
xˆ∗ (θ, ω) g (θ)dθ∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ) dθ +
∫ θ4
θ3
g (θ) dθ
,
(134)
E
[
yˆ2I
]
=
∫ θmax
θ1
(xˆ∗ (θ, ω))2
g (θ)∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ) dθ
dθ, (135)
E
[
yˆ2II
]
=
∫ θ4
θ3
(xˆ∗ (θ, ω))2
g (θ)∫ θ4
θ3
g (θ) dθ
dθ, (136)
E
[
yˆ2
]
=
∫ θmax
θ1
(xˆ∗ (θ, ω))2 g (θ) dθ+
∫ θ4
θ3
(xˆ∗ (θ, ω))2 g (θ)dθ∫ θmax
θ1
g (θ) dθ +
∫ θ4
θ3
g (θ) dθ
.
(137)
These equations can be derived based on the definitions
of these terms and Proposition 5. Specifically, as studied
in Proposition 5, users with θ ∈ [θ1, θmax] subscribe and
watch ads, and users with θ ∈ [θ3, θ4) watch ads without
subscription.
According to (129) and (125), we can derive the following
relation:
Kmˆ∗I (ω, pI) pI +Kmˆ
∗
II (ω, pII) pII
=K
B − p
2A
E [yˆ]
E [yˆ2]
pNˆad (ω)E [yˆ]
=Kmˆ∗ (ω, p) p. (138)
Then, we can see that the value of objective (20) under
(ω, pI, pII) equals the value of objective (18) under (ω, p).
Combining Step 1 and Step 2, we can conclude that the
optimal objective value of problem (20)-(23) is no less than the
optimal objective value of problem (18)-(19). In other words,
we have ΠSURD ≥ ΠSUR.
APPENDIX Q
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Proof. Step 1: We derive the operator’s optimal total revenue
under the SAR scheme when C approaches infinity.
Based on Proposition 4, under the SAR scheme, the op-
erator’s optimal unit reward ω∗ = D−1 (C). According to
our analysis in Appendix H, when ω ∈
(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(Q) ,∞
)
, the
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expression of D (ω) is given by
D (ω) =NQ
∫ θmax
θ2
g (θ) dθ
+N
∫ θmax
θ2
(
(u′)−1
(
Φ
ωθ
)
−Q
)
g (θ) dθ
=NQ
θmax − θ2
θmax
+
N
θmax
∫ θmax
θ2
(
ωθ
Φ
− 1−Q
)
dθ.
(139)
We can see that limω→∞D (ω) =∞. Hence, when C →∞,
we have ω∗ →∞.
Next, we prove that when ω →∞, the corresponding θ2 →
0. According to the defitition of θ2, the value of θ2 is upper
bounded by θ0 and is lower bounded by 0. In Appendix D,
we have proved that dθ2dω < 0 for any given ω. Hence, when
ω → ∞, the limit of θ2 exists. Let ζ ∈ [0, θ0] denote this
limit. From θ2’s definition, when u (z) = ln (1 + z) and θ ∼
U [0, θmax], θ2 satisfies the following equation:
θ2 ln
(
θ2ω
Φ
)
− F − θ2 + (1 +Q) Φ
ω
= 0. (140)
When we take ω →∞ on both sides of the equation, we can
see that the equality holds only when ζ = 0. That is to say,
when ω →∞, the corresponding θ2 → 0.
Based on our analysis in Step 2 of Appendix J,
when ω ∈
(
Φu(Q)
Fu′(Q) ,∞
)
, the operator’s revenue function
Rtotal (ω, p∗ (ω)) is as follows:
Rtotal (ω, p∗ (ω)) =
θmax − θ2
θmax
NF
+ p∗ (ω) (B − p∗ (ω)) 3KΦ
8Aθmax
(
y2h − y2l
)2
y3h − y3l
N, (141)
where yh = θmax−θ1Φ , yl =
θ2−θ1
Φ , and p
∗ (ω) =
max
{
B − 4A3K y
3
h−y3l
y2h−y2l
, B2
}
. When ω →∞, we can verify that
θ1 → 0, yh → θmaxΦ , and yl → 0. Then, we can derive the
limit of the revenue function under ω →∞ as follows:
lim
ω→∞R
total (ω, p∗ (ω)) = NF
+max
{
B− 4A
3K
θmax
Φ
,
B
2
}(
B−max
{
B− 4A
3K
θmax
Φ
,
B
2
})
3K
8A
N.
(142)
When C → ∞, ω∗ → ∞. Hence, the operator’s optimal
revenue under the SAR scheme for C → ∞ is characterized
in (142).
Step 2: We discuss the maximum possible value of the
operator’s total revenue under the SUR scheme.
(i) When ω ∈
[
0, (1+Q)Φθmax
]
, no user watches ads. When ω ∈(
(1+Q)Φ
θmax
, Φ ln(1+Q)F
]
, the value of y is uniformly distributed in[
0, θmax−θ1Φ
]
. Hence, when ω ∈
[
0, Φ ln(1+Q)F
]
, we can derive
the upper bound for the operator’s total revenue as follows:
Rˆtotal (ω, pˆ∗ (ω)) ≤θmax − θ0
θmax
NF
+ pˆ∗ (ω) (B − pˆ∗ (ω)) 3K
8A
θmax − θ1
θmax
N,
(143)
where pˆ∗ (ω) = max
{
B − 4A3K θmax−θ1Φ , B2
}
. We compare the
right-hand side of the above inequality with the right-hand
side of (142). We can see that the right-hand side of (142) is
always larger.
(ii) When ω ∈
(
Φ ln(1+Q)
F ,
ΦQ
F
)
, we have the following
relation:
Rˆtotal (ω, pˆ∗ (ω)) =
θmax − θ4
θmax
NF
+pˆ∗(ω)(B−pˆ∗ (ω))3K
8A
(
1+ηˆ2
)2
(1+ηˆ) (1+ηˆ3)
θmax−θ1+θ4−θ3
θmax
N,
(144)
where ηˆ , min{θmax−θ1,θ4−θ3}max{θmax−θ1,θ4−θ3} , yˆmax ,
max{θmax−θ1,θ4−θ3}
Φ ,
and pˆ∗ (ω) = max
{
B − 4A3K 1+ηˆ
3
1+ηˆ2 yˆmax,
B
2
}
. Based on 0 ≤
ηˆ ≤ 1, we can easily show that (1+ηˆ
2)
2
(1+ηˆ)(1+ηˆ3) ≤ 1. Moreover,
we have θmax > θ1 and θ4 > θ3. Therefore, the following
relation holds:
Rˆtotal (ω, pˆ∗ (ω))<
θmax−θ4
θmax
NF+pˆ∗ (ω) (B−pˆ∗ (ω)) 3K
8A
N.
(145)
Next, we compare θmaxΦ and
1+ηˆ3
1+ηˆ2 yˆmax. Since 0 ≤ ηˆ ≤ 1,
we have 1+ηˆ
3
1+ηˆ2 = 1 − 1−ηˆ1+ηˆ2 ηˆ2 ≤ 1. Moreover, yˆmax =
max{θmax−θ1,θ4−θ3}
Φ <
max{θmax,θ4}
Φ ≤ θmaxΦ . Hence, we can
see that θmaxΦ >
1+ηˆ3
1+ηˆ2 yˆmax. Based on this relation, we can
verify that the following relation holds:
max
{
B− 4A
3K
θmax
Φ
,
B
2
}(
B−max
{
B− 4A
3K
θmax
Φ
,
B
2
})
≥
max
{
B− 4A
3K
1+ηˆ3
1+ηˆ2
yˆmax,
B
2
}(
B−max
{
B− 4A
3K
1+ηˆ3
1+ηˆ2
yˆmax,
B
2
})
.
(146)
Therefore, we can see that the right-hand side of (145) is
smaller than (142).
(iii) When ω ∈
[
ΦQ
F ,∞
)
, we have the following relation:
Rˆtotal (ω, pˆ∗ (ω)) = pˆ∗ (ω) (B − pˆ∗ (ω)) 3K
8A
θmax − θ3
θmax
N,
(147)
where pˆ∗ (ω) = max
{
B − 4A3K θmax−θ3Φ , B2
}
. Since θ3 = Φω
decreases with ω, we can easily prove that Rˆtotal (ω, pˆ∗ (ω))
increases with ω. We can compute the limit of this revenue
28
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(a) Example A.
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(b) Example B.
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(c) Example C.
Fig. 9: ΠSAR, ΠSUR, and ΠSURD Under Different Network Capacity (Uniformly Distributed θ and Logarithmic Utility).
function under ω →∞ as follows:
lim
ω→∞ Rˆ
total (ω, pˆ∗ (ω)) =
max
{
B− 4A
3K
θmax
Φ
,
B
2
}(
B−max
{
B− 4A
3K
θmax
Φ
,
B
2
})
3K
8A
N.
(148)
We compare the right-hand side of the above equation with
the right-hand side of (142). We can see that the right-hand
side of (142) is always larger.
Combining the above analysis for all cases of ω (including
the case where ω → ∞), we can see that the operator’s
maximum possible total revenue under the SUR scheme is
always smaller than the value of the right-hand side of (142).
Because the right-hand side of (142) is the operator’s optimal
total revenue under the SAR when C →∞, we complete the
proof.
APPENDIX R
NUMERICAL RESULTS UNDER DIFFERENT SETTINGS
In this section, we show the numerical comparison among
ΠSAR, ΠSUR, and ΠSURD under more parameter settings.
Similar to Fig. 5(a), we assume that each user’s type θ
follows a uniform distribution and u (z) = ln (1 + z). We run
experiments under three different parameter settings.
First, we choose N = 107, F = 25, Q = 0.7, θ ∼
U [0, 155], Φ = 0.2, K = 30, A = 0.5, and B = 3. We
plot ΠSAR, ΠSUR, and ΠSURD against C in Fig. 9(a).
Second, we choose N = 105, F = 32, Q = 0.6, θ ∼
U [0, 170], Φ = 0.3, K = 18, A = 0.6, and B = 4. We plot
ΠSAR, ΠSUR, and ΠSURD against C in Fig. 9(b).
Third, we choose N = 104, F = 28, Q = 0.6, θ ∼
U [0, 150], Φ = 0.2, K = 18, A = 0.4, and B = 3. We
plot ΠSAR, ΠSUR, and ΠSURD against C in Fig. 9(c).
We can see that our key observations in Fig. 5(a) also hold
in Fig. 9(a), 9(b), and 9(c). For example, if C is small, the
SUR scheme achieves a higher operator’s revenue; otherwise,
the SAR scheme achieves a higher operator’s revenue. The ad
slots’ differentiation can improve the operator’s revenue under
the SUR scheme.
